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We are pleased to transmit the enclosed report by Paul Verkuil and Jeffrey Lubbers, titled 
Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social Security Disability Cases.  This year Social 
Security’s disability programs will account for nearly five percent of the Federal budget, about 
$100 billion.  Nearly 10 million people depend upon them for benefits.  They deserve the close 
attention of policy makers and the public.  
The current arrangements for handling disability claims and appeals are in dire need of 
reform.  As we stated in our January 2001 report, Charting the Future of Social Security’s 
Disability Programs: The Need for Fundamental Change, Social Security’s multi-step disability 
claims and appeals system is currently overwhelmed and in critical condition.  The need for 
reform will become even more acute as the baby boomers reach the age of increased likelihood of 
disability and the number of applications grows substantially.   
Over the last decade, the number of disability cases being appealed to the Federal district 
courts has increased rapidly, from about 7,000 in 1991 to about 16,000 in 2001, and it is expected 
to continue to grow.  There are now more than 30,000 disability cases pending in the courts. 
The report by Professors Verkuil and Lubbers was written under contract with the Board.  
It analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of two major proposals for change that have been 
made over the years: to create a new Article I Social Security Court with Article III review 
limited to legal and constitutional issues, or, to maintain the current district court review structure 
but centralize court of appeals review in a special Article III court (a Social Security Court of 
Appeals).  The authors conclude that, on balance, an Article I review structure would produce real 
improvements in the system of administrative justice.     
Professors Verkuil and Lubbers are distinguished scholars who have studied Social 
Security’s disability determination process for many years.  Their report is an informed and 
thoughtful contribution to the broad discussion that needs to take place if comprehensive and 
fundamental changes in the disability programs are to be made.   Although the Board has taken no 
definitive position at this time on the issues analyzed in this report, we strongly believe they 
deserve urgent attention.   
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Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of 
Social Security Disability Cases 
A Report to the Social Security Advisory Board 
By Paul Verkuil and Jeffrey Lubbers* 
I. Introduction 
This Report was commissioned by the Social Security Advisory Board 
(“SSAB”).4  Its goal is to evaluate various proposals for changes in the judicial review 
structure relating to Social Security disability determinations.  These proposals have 
emanated from Congress, federal court advisory bodies, knowledgeable observers, 
agency officials, and academics.  SSA’s own Disability Advisory Committee in 1989 
recommended that a study be done concerning “possible alternatives to the present 
method of court review of Social Security cases.”5  At least two contrasting legislative 
proposals have been pending for several years that span the range of realistic 
possibilities:  one would change the review structure after the ALJ stage by creating a 
new Article I court structure (a Social Security Court) with Article III review limited to 
legal and constitutional issues; another would maintain the current district court review 
structure but centralize court of appeals review in a special Article III court (a Social 
Security Court of Appeals). 
* The authors would like to thank Owen Kendler, Class of 2002, University of Pennsylvania Law School,
for his excellent research assistance, particularly with respect to the veterans claims appeals process. 
4 Contract # SSA -REG-02-0026. 
5 REPORT OF THE DISABILITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY (July 25, 
1989) 15, 19 (reiterating a recommendation it made in March 1988 that the Department of Justice prepare 
such a study). 
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 A. The Timeliness of This Report 
 While these alternatives are not themselves new, they have become increasingly 
relevant in light of recent events.  The number of disability claims is expected to rise in 
the future for several reasons:  (1) the impending retirement of Baby Boomers,6 (2) the 
downturn of the economy in the last two years,7 (3) the resumption of continuing 
disability reviews (“CDRs”) by the SSA, 8 and (4) the increasing tendency of private 
insurance companies to require as a condition of payments that claimants pursue their 
offsetting SSA disability benefits.9  These caseload realities create pressure on the SSA to 
achieve more uniform, fair, and efficient decisionmaking and will eventually add to the 
caseload of the federal courts on judicial review.  By the mid-1990s, several studies of 
the federal judiciary had indicated that alternatives to the increasing federal caseload 
                                                 
6 See Statement of Stanford G. Ross, Chairman Social Security Advisory Board at the Tenth National 
Educational Conference, Association of Administrative Law Judges (Oct. 3, 2001) (“SSA actuaries project 
continued rapid growth as the baby boomers reach the greater likelihood of disability.”); SSAB, A GENDA 
FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: CHALLENGES FOR THE NEW CONGRESS AND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION,  at 1, 2, 16 
& 37 (Feb. 2001), available at http://www.ssab.gov/Overview1.pdf.  Baby Boomers will begin to reach the 
age of 65 in 2011 and finish reaching 65 in 2030.  When they begin to retire in 2011, there will be 40.4 
million seniors (or 13 percent of the population) and will grow to 70.3 million (20 percent of the 
population) by 2030.  See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Projects Doubling of 
Nation’s Population by 2100 (Jan. 13, 2000). 
7 It is well known that while the disability program is not an employment scheme, applications rise when 
the economy falters. 
8 The SSA is currently in its seven-year CDR plan, commenced in 1996.  The plan is part of the agency’s 
response to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62.  It calls for 
increasing annual CDRs from 603,000 in 1997 to 1.7 million in 2002 with a peak year of 1.8 million in 
2000.  See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL,  SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,  REPORT #  A-01-99-
91002, AUDIT REPORT : PERFORMANCE MEASURE REVIEW: RELIABILITY OF THE DATA USED TO MEASURE 
CONTINUING DISABILITY REVIEWS (June 2000), at A-5-A-6.  Our report takes no position on revisions to 
the  CDR program. 
9 Cf. D. Gregory Rogers, The Effects of Social Security Awards on Long-Term Disability Claims, 1 ATLA 
ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS 1117, 1117 (July 2001).  Conversations with the SSAB 
have also created a suspicion that private insurance policies are beginning to require appeals through the 
ALJ stage before payment of insurance benefits, but the situation is too recent for data to have been 
compiled. 
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 should be sought.10  While the district court caseload only represents a small segment of 
total SSA disability cases, it is a significant and growing portion of the federal courts’ 
civil case workload.11   
In addition, during the last decade, a possible model for Article I/Article III 
shared review of disability cases has become reality with the emergence of a program for 
review of the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) disability claims.  The presence of 
an operating Article I disability court structure, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 
makes it possible now to actually compare alternative disability review systems.12  
Finally, in 1994, Congress also made a significant structural change in the social security 
program, by separating SSA from the Department of Health and Human Services to 
“ensure that ‘policy errors resulting from inappropriate influence from outside the agency 
such as those occurring in the early 1980s do not recur in the future.’”13  As a result, the 
agency is now independent and better able to assist in a restructuring of the process. 
                                                 
10 See JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 33 (Dec. 
1995); see also  COMM. ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 65 (Oct. 
1998); RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1992), at 
http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305877.html. 
11 In the fiscal year ending September 30, 1999, SSA disability cases constituted 4.6 percent of all federal 
civil cases terminated through court action, while in the period ending March 31, 2001, SSA disability 
cases constituted 6.0 percent of such cases.  Compare ANNUAL REP . OF THE DIR., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1999 at Table C-4, 160-61 (1999) (reporting that 13,454 social security cases 
terminated out of 228,190 terminated civil cases), at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus1999/supps.html; with 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTIC [SIC], Table C-4 (Mar. 31, 
2001) (12,646 of 207,087 terminated civil cases), available at http://www.uscourts.gov 
/caseload2001/tables/c04mar01.pdf. 
12 Prior to 1988, VA disability decisions were unreviewable by statute:  “[All decisions] shall be final and 
conclusive on all questions of law and fact, and no other official or court of the United States shall have 
jurisdiction to review by mandamus or otherwise any such decision.”  Act of March 20, 1933, ch.3, § 5, 48 
Stat. 8, 9 (repealed and superseded by Pub. L. No. 85-86, 71 Stat. 167) (cited by WILLIAM F. FOX, THE 
UNITED STATES BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS: THE UNFINISHED STRUGGLE TO RECONCILE SPEED AND 
JUSTICE DURING INTRA-AGENCY REVIEW 19 (2000)). 
13 Statement by Rogelio Garcia, Congressional Research Service, House Subcommittee on Social Security, 
pp. CRS-4-CRS-5 (July 25, 1996), quoting  H. REP . No. 103-670, Social Security Administration Reform 
Act of 1994, 103rd Cong. p. 90 (1994), as cited by ASS’N OF ADMIN. LAW JUDGES, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE TRANSFER OF THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
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 For all these reasons, a study of judicial review alternatives is timely and 
potentially more productive than it has been at any time in the recent past.  While there 
has not been any legislation introduced since 1995, this Report could well serve as an 
analytical predicate to renewed congressional interest. 
B.  Organization of this Report. 
 This Report will proceed as follows:  First, it analyzes the existing SSA disability 
review structure with its strengths and weaknesses; next it analyzes various alternatives 
for judicial review, along with an evaluation of the VA disability review structure; 
finally, this Report compares the proposed alternatives against the existing SSA structure 
and makes recommendations, where feasible.  It concludes by suggesting areas for further 
study. 
 It is important to note that this Report is primarily a study of the appeals process, 
whether it be Article III or Article I based.  The Report will not deal at length with the 
administrative decision structure at SSA below the Appeals Council stage.  It recognizes 
that the greatest potential for meaningful reforms in the SSA process occur in the intake, 
reconsideration, and hearing stages when the caseload is the highest.  But our mandate is 
to take the hearing caseload level as a given, and to describe alternatives in the final 
stages of review—at the Appeals Council and judicial review level.  Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                                                 
ADJUDICATIONS OF SOCIAL SECURITY ACT CLAIMS FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION TO A 
NEW INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCY 5 (Jan. 2001), available at http://www.aalj.org/sepplan.html 
[hereinafter REPORT ON NEW INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCY].  See also Statement of Ronald G. 
Bernoski, President, Association of Administrative Law Judges Before the House Subcomm. on Social 
Security, Comm. on Ways and Means, Hearing on the Social Security Disability Programs’ Challenges and 
Opportunities (June 28, 2001), available at http://www.aalj.org/sepplan-statement.doc.  The “inappropriate 
influence” referred to includes the targeting of ALJs with high allowance rates for special review and 
training during the Reagan Administration.  The program was held to be improper (and then withdrawn by 
SSA) after an ALJ organization challenged it in Association of Administrative Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 
594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C 1984).  See Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations:  
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 although the Report does explore the role of the administrative law judges as part of a 
possible move to an Article I alternative court structure, many other important questions, 
including the role of state deciders in the current process14 and the need for better quality 
assurance systems15 will be left for further study. 16 
 It should be noted that, with respect to many of these questions, the authors urge 
that the many recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States 
(ACUS) be considered.  ACUS undertook numerous studies relating to the appeals 
process in the Social Security Administration (SSA) disability program.  It issued four 
recommendations specifically involving the various levels of review in that program.17  
In Recommendation 87-6, State-Level Determinations in Social Security Disability 
Cases, ACUS addressed the first level of determination and review in the disability 
program.  The underlying study was based on early results from demonstration projects 
                                                                                                                                                 
Recommendations for Reform, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 497-502 (detailing SSA’s controversial practices 
with respect to its ALJs). 
14 See, e.g.,  GAO, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY:  SSA MUST HOLD ITSELF ACCOUNTABLE FOR 
CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT IN DECISION-MAKING, GAO/HEHS-97-102 (Aug. 1997).  See also  REPORT OF 
THE DISABILITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, supra  note 2 at 17, 
(urging changes in the DDS process). 
15 See, e.g., THE LEWIN GROUP,  PUGH ETTINGER MCCARTHY ASSOCIATES,  & CORNELL UNIVERSITY, 
EVALUATION OF SSA’S DISABILITY QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) PROCESSES AND DEVELOPMENT OF QA 
OPTIONS THAT WILL SUPPORT THE LONG-TERM MANAGEMENT OF THE DISABILITY PROGRAM, (Mar. 16, 
2001). 
16 This Report primarily covers cases involving disability under the Disability Insurance program (Title II 
of the Social Security Act) and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program (Title XVI), which 
accounts for 90 percent of the work of SSA’s Office of Hearings and Appeals.  The remainder consists of 
claims made under the Retirement and Survivors Insurance program (Title II), Medicare (Title XVIII), and 
non-disability claims under the SSI program.  See About SSA’s Office of Hearings and Appeals, available 
at http://www.ssa.gov/oha/overview.htm.  Appeals under Medicare Parts A and B constituted about 11% of 
the hearing dispositions by SSA ALJs in FY 2000.  See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, 
ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 117, Table 2.F9 (2000).  Because these Medicare cases are now being 
heard under an agreement with the Department of HHS, we take no position on whether they should 
necessarily be treated in the same way as disability cases, if our recommendations are followed. 
17 These recommendations can be found at “Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the 
United States,” available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/acustoc.html.  Professor Verkuil 
was a member of ACUS and Professor Lubbers was ACUS’s Research Director from 1982-95.  ACUS’s 
operations ceased in October 1995.  See Symposium in 30 ARIZ. ST . L.J. 1-204 (1998). 
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 involving the state- level disability determination process.  It recommended additional 
experimentation with face-to-face hearings and interviews at this level. 
Recommendation 78-2, Procedures for Determining Social Security Disability 
Claims,18 primarily addressed the administrative law judge stage of the Social Security 
disability program.  It recommended the continued use of ALJs, and made suggestions 
concerning the development of the evidentiary hearing record, including recommending 
that ALJs take more care in questioning claimants, seek to collect as much evidence prior 
to the hearing as possible, make greater use of prehearing interviews, and make better use 
of treating physicians as sources of information.  It also recommended closing of the 
record at the ALJ stage and better development and dissemination of precedent materials 
by the SSA. 
Recommendation 87-7, A New Role for the Social Security Appeals Council,19 
addressed the organization and function of the Appeals Council.  ACUS suggested wide-
ranging and substantial changes in the workings of the Appeals Council, including that it 
move away from its historical primary function as a case review panel.  The 
recommendation suggested that the caseload be significantly limited, and that the 
Appeals Council focus on important issues on which it could issue precedential opinions. 
In Recommendation 90-4, Social Security Disability Program Appeals Process: 
Supplementary Recommendation,20 the Conference addressed the need to have the 
                                                 
18 43 Fed. Reg. 27,508 (June 26, 1978).  This recommendation was based largely on JERRY L. MASHAW, 
CHARLES L. GOETZ,  FRANK I. GOODMAN,  WARREN F. SCHWARTZ,  PAUL R. VERKUIL & MILTON M. 
CARROW,  SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS (Lexington 1978) [hereinafter MASHAW ET . AL.].  
(This study was done through the National Center for Administration Justice, Milton Carrow, Director, and 
was led by Professor Mashaw of the Yale Law School.)   
19 52 Fed. Reg. 49,143 (Dec. 30,1987). 
20 55 Fed. Reg. 34,213 (Aug. 22, 1990). 
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 evidentiary record be as complete as possible as early in the process as possible.  It 
advocated an increased use of subpoenas to make this possible, and in conjunction with a 
provision in an earlier Recommendation, that physicians asked to provide medical 
information in disability proceedings be adequately compensated.21  The Conference also 
reiterated that the record before the ALJ should be closed at a set time after the hearing.  
The recommended procedure would give the claimant sufficient time to acquire such 
information as is needed to complete the record, and would also provide for extensions of 
time upon a showing of good cause.  As a corollary to this, the Conference urged that a 
procedure be developed for the ALJ to reopen a record upon petition by the claimant 
where there is new and material evidence relating to the period covered by the hearing.22 
II.  Overview of the Current SSA Disability Review Structure 
The current judicial review structure has been in place since the beginning of the 
program. 23  In terms of administrative review, it is unique in its scope and workload.  No 
                                                 
21 See ACUS Recommendation 89-10, Improved Use of Medical Personnel in Social Security Disability 
Determinations, ¶5(c), 55 Fed. Reg. 34,212 (Aug. 22, 1990).  This recommendation also urged enhanced 
use of medical personnel at the initial decision level, better identification of conflicts over medical 
evidence, and heavier reliance on medical experts at the ALJ stage.  It also suggested that if these reforms 
were instituted, the initial determination level should be a single step—with the elimination of the separate 
reconsideration stage. 
22 Such petitions could be filed within one year of the ALJ decision or while the case is pending before the 
Appeals Council if it has been appealed.  Under such a procedure, new evidence would be considered first 
by the ALJ, thereby giving the adjudicator most familiar with the case the first opportunity to review new 
evidence, potentially reducing the number of cases that would be presented to the Appeals Council, and 
giving the Appeals Council more of an appellate role.  Id.  
23 Federal district court review of all Social Security decisions in which the Commissioner of Social 
Security was a party has been available since the SSA was created in 1935.  See 42 U.S.C. § 405, 42 Stat. 
624 (Aug. 14, 1935).  ALJs (formerly designated as hearing examiners) were used from the inception of the 
DI program in 1956.  Due to the mounting caseload, the Office of Hearings and Appeals was created in 
1959.  When the SSI program was federalized and added to the SSA in 1972, it used the existing SSA 
disability appeals system.  In cases involving termination of benefits, SSA’s practice was to offer only an 
informal pre-termination hearing, followed by a formal post-termination hearing before an ALJ, see 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 346 (1976) (upholding this process against a due process challenge).  
However, Congress provided for pre-termination ALJ hearings in 1983, see 42 U.S.C. § 423(g), added by 
Pub. L. No. 97-455 (1983).  See also SOC. SEC. ADMIN. ONLINE, DETAILED CHRONOLOGY, available at 
http://www.ssa.gov /history/chrono.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2002) and Daniel J. Gifford, Federal 
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 other program of the federal government produces such a large and complicated 
caseload for the federal courts to review, and of course no other benefit program of the 
federal government serves over 10 million beneficiaries or involves expenditures that will 
top $100 billion in FY 2002.24 
A.  The Role of the District Court 
 After the Social Security Administration signs off on a disability case, either as a 
result of an ALJ decision or Appeals Council consideration, the losing claimant has an 
opportunity to appeal to the federal district court.  While traditionally known as a trial 
court, the federal district court serves an appellate function in SSA disability review.  In 
this role, it is called upon not to hear matters in a trial de novo as it traditionally does,25 
but to apply the substantial evidence standard to the record before it.26  Over the years, 
substantial evidence reviews of disability cases by district courts (and even subsequent 
review of such decisions by courts of appeals) have remained a heavily contested 
matter.27 
This modification of the role of district courts is made necessary because of the 
size of the disability caseload, which makes the usual practice of direct review of formal 
                                                                                                                                                 
Administrative Law Judges: The Relevance of Past Choices to Future Directions, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 14-
19 (1997) (providing a concise history of the SSA appeals  legislation).   
24 SSAB, CHARTING THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY’S DISABILITY SYSTEM: THE NEED FOR 
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 1 (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter SSAB, CHARTING THE FUTURE], at http://www.ssab.gov 
/disabilitywhitepap.pdf. 
25 The district courts do hear other miscellaneous appeals from agencies because, under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, the venue for judicial review of agency action is controlled by the underlying programmatic 
statute.  If the statute is silent on the matter, judicial review is only available through a suit for injunctive or 
declaratory relief in the appropriate district court.  See 5 U.S.C. § 703. 
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 405g (commonly referred to as Social Security Act § 205(g)), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/ssact/title02/0205.htm. 
27 See, e.g., Davis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 670, 675-76 (8th Cir. 1997) (Beezer, J. dissenting) (stating that the 
ALJ’s denial of benefits was clearly supported by substantial evidence). 
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 administrative adjudication in the courts of appeals manifestly impractical. 28  For 
example, during the decade 1990 to 2000, the number of new disability cases in the 
federal courts nearly tripled from 5,000 to 15,000,29 while during this period the disability 
caseload in the courts of appeals varied far less greatly, going from 992 appeals in 198830 
to 754 appeals in 2001.31  In terms of impact upon the court system, during the one-year 
period ending September 30, 2000, Social Security cases represented 5.86 percent of all 
civil district court cases, but only 2.5 percent of all civil cases in the courts of appeals.32  
But if one assumed that disability cases went directly to the courts of appeals during this 
period, they would have represented a backbreaking 19.6 percent of the appeals courts’ 
civil caseload.33 
 Federal district courts play a significant symbolic role as well as a corrective one 
in our judicial system.  For social security disability claimants, access to the federal 
courts helps to legitimate their claims.  As an earlier study of the SSA disability system 
observed, review by a judge of broad competence guarantees a fresh and independent 
                                                 
28 See MASHAW  ET AL., supra  note 15 at 125.  Most statutes establishing formal agency adjudicative 
programs specify that judicial review is by the courts of appeals because a trial-type hearing has already 
been held before an agency adjudicator, and review is to be had on the basis of the administrative record 
below.  However, due to the high volume of SSA disability cases, review is placed in the district court in 
the first instance.  See generally David Currie & Frank Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal 
Administrative Action:  Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. (1975). 
29 See SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD,  DISABILITY DECISION MAKING: DATA AND MATERIALS 84 
(Jan. 2001) [hereinafter SSAB, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING]; ANNUAL REP . OF THE DIR., JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 2000 [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000] at Table S-17 (2000) 
available at  http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/contents.html (displaying data for 1990 and 1996 through 
2000). 
30 REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL, U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS: REPORT 1988 at Table B1-A (1988) [hereinafter REPORT 1988]. 
31 See ANNUAL REP . OF THE DIR., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 2001 at Table B-7 
(2001) (displaying data for the twelve month period ending March 31, 2001) [hereinafter JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS 2001]. 
32 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra  note 26, at Tables B1-A & C-4 (2000), (942 of 37,336 civil 
terminations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2000). 
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 look at the disability decision process.34  Federal courts are in principle the best 
assurance we have that a citizen will be treated fairly. 
But over the years the theoretical advantage of judicial oversight has become 
more limited in practice.  District judges increasingly review disability cases not by 
themselves, but through established surrogates:  magistrate judges take evidence, decide 
on summary judgment, or remand to the agency. 35  In FY 1999, magistrates decided over 
40 percent of disability cases.36 
 While the use of magistrate judges is well accepted in this and other contexts, 
they are in fact Article I rather than Article III deciders.37  They are often called upon to 
perform routine matters (like overseeing discovery disputes) or to make decisions in 
situations with repetitive fact patterns, like SSA disability cases.  They are in effect 
administrative deciders within the Article III system.  Indeed, in terms of selection 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 See id. at Tables B1 & C-4. 
34 See MASHAW ET AL. supra  note 15, at 139. 
35 Technically, the magistrate recommends a course of action to the district judge and the district judge has 
discretion as to whether to sign and enter the decision.  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).  Magistrate judges 
hear SSA matters under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).  The statute allows a district judge to assign cases to 
magistrate judges to conduct hearings and to submit to the judge proposed findings of fact and a 
recommendation for the disposition in the case.  Any party has ten days to ask the judge to review the 
magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo .  The recommendations may accept, reject or 
modify the magistrate judge’s report in whole or in part. 
36 Magistrate judges disposed of 6,132 social security cases in FY 1999 and 5,516 in FY 2000.  This is out 
of a total of 15,537 social security terminations in FY 1999 (39.4 percent) and 14,731 in FY 2000 (37.4 
percent).  This is down from 54.6 percent in 1988.  See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra  note 26,Table S-17, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/tables/s17sep00.pdf.; ANNUAL REPORTS for 1999 and 
2000 supra  note 26, Table C-4; REPORT 1988, supra  note 27, at Table C-4. 
37 It may be more apt to identify U.S. Magistrate Judges as “Title 28 Judges.”  While they are agents of 
Article III judiciary, magistrate judges are not themselves Article III judges.  Congress has authorized the 
Judicial Conference of the United States to determine the salary and number of magistrate judges in each 
district.  A magistrate judge’s salary can be no more than 92 percent of a district courts judge’s salary.  
Once the required number is established, each of the 97 federal districts hire magistrate judges by a 
majority vote of the judges in the district.  Full-time magistrate judges serve eight-year terms and can be 
rehired for addit ional terms until the age of seventy.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631, 633, 634, 636, 637; see also  
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 682-83 & n.11 (1980) (analogizing magistrate judges to special 
masters and distinguishing them from Article III judges). 
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 criteria and experience, magistrates are not that far removed from ALJs,38 and there are 
not many functional differences between the two corps of administrative deciders.  Since 
the district court applies the substantial evidence test, SSA cases rarely go to trial.  In 
2001, only 0.25 percent of disability cases reached oral arguments in district court,39 
which is about the same as the 0.31 percent in 1988.40 
 In applying the substantial evidence test, district courts are in theory bound to 
affirm an agency’s findings of facts if there is some support in the record for the agency’s 
position.  Under the familiar APA standard, substantial evidence is defined as more than 
a “scintilla,” which must be found after consideration of the whole record.41  This 
standard is meant to be very deferential,42 although ALJ decisions on witness and 
physician credibility remain part of the equation.  
                                                 
38 If anything, the qualifications and protections for ALJs are stronger than for magistrate judges.  
Magistrate judges are appointed for a term of eight years while ALJs do not have a term.  Magistrate judges 
must be a member in good standing of the bar for five years to be eligible; ALJs for seven years.  
Magistrate judges are appointed by district court merit selection panels, composed of residents of the 
individual judicial districts; ALJs are appointed by agencies off a list of qualified eligible applicants after 
an examination by the Office of Personnel Management.  Removal of magistrate judges by the judges 
during the term of office must be only for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental 
disability.  ALJs may be disciplined or remo ved only for “good cause” demonstrated before the Merit 
Systems Protection Board.  See 28 USCA § 631 (magistrate judges) and 5 U.S.C. § 7521; 5 CFR § 
930.203a; and “USA Jobs:  Administrative Law Judges,” available at 
http://www.usajobs.opm.gov/EI28.htm (ALJs). 
39 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2001 supra  note 28, at Table C-4.  This is one tenth of the percentage of all civil 
cases (2.3 percent) that went to trial before district courts in 2001.  See id. 
40 See REPORT 1988 supra  note 27, at Table C-4.  
41 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & 
Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939) (“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, and must do more 
than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established.”).  Another oft-quoted Supreme Court 
formulation is “such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).  See ERNEST GELLHORN AND RONALD M. 
LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 92 (4TH ED. 1997).  In a subsequent case 
involving the SSA disability process, the Court made it clear that even evidence that would be inadmissible 
in court and was not subject to cross-examination before an ALJ could constitute substantial evidence.  
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). 
42 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.2 (1994). 
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 But deference is not what the statistics show in SSA cases.  District courts have 
long reversed and remanded disability cases on a greater than 50 percent basis,43 although 
these rates vary greatly among judicial districts.44  It is difficult to know what this 
reversal/remand rate (which instead approximates what one might expect under a de novo 
review system) actually reflects.45  In one respect, it shows that district court judges (and 
magistrates) are skeptical if not antagonistic to the quality of the underlying SSA decision 
process, which may be due to factors that are no longer compelling.46  But it may also be 
the result of an unusual statutory relationship with the agency itself. 
The “good cause” remand function (under section 205(g) 47) gives the district 
court an opportunity to exercise policy control.  The remand provision places the district 
courts “not in the accustomed role as external overseers of the administrative process . . . 
but virtually as co-participants in the process . . . .”48  In effect, this unique standard 
allows (perhaps even encourages) the district courts, or their magistrate judges, to send 
cases back almost reflexively.  Since the likelihood is that on remand the agency will 
                                                 
43 See infra, Section V (note 113 and accompanying text). 
44 See infra, Appendix A (showing variations in reversal rates by judicial district with significant numbers 
of SSA disability cases, from 2.3 percent in the Eastern District of Kentucky to 53.8% in the Southern 
District of New York of judgments on the merits). 
45 See Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards (forthcoming 2002). 
46 See id. at 37 (discussing reactions of the courts to the controversial congressionally mandated 
(“Bellmon”) review program which removed claimants from the disability rolls in the 1980s); see also 
REPORT ON NEW INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCY, supra  note 10. 
47 Social Security Act § 205(g) provides in relevant part:   
(g) . . . The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported 
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, . . . .  The court may, on motion of the 
Commissioner of Social Security made for good cause shown before the Commissioner 
files the Commissioner’s answer, remand the case to the Commissioner of Social 
Security for further action by the Commissioner of Social Security . . . . 42 U.S.C. 405(g). 
48 See MASHAW ET AL. ET AL., supra  note 15, at 133. 
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 enter judgment in the claimant’s favor,49 this decision of the court often becomes 
outcome determinative.  Given this ease of remand, one would think, the present system 
of judicial review has incentives built- in to resolve matters quickly and without a large 
investment of district court time.  Yet, the average time SSA cases sit before the district 
court is a non-expeditious twelve to eighteen months.50 
B.  Established Critiques of the Present System 
 When the judicial phase was looked at in depth twenty-five years ago, several 
suggestions were made to improve the process.  First, it was suggested that the record 
should be closed after the ALJ stage; and, second, that the good cause remand option 
under Section 205(g) be eliminated.51  The purpose of these relatively modest changes 
was to fix responsibility:  “if there is ever to be agreement on whether anyone in the 
whole multi- tier process of disability claims adjudication has ever committed an error, 
there must be one locus of responsibility for developing a record and review of that 
record.”52 
                                                 
49 Remands to the Appeals Council result in grants over 60 percent of the time.  See SSAB, CHARTING THE 
FUTURE, supra  note 21, at 14. 
50 Compare id. at 7 with Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Judicial Statistical Inquiry Form: 
Federal District-Court Civil Case (providing a dataset that reveals an average time of 357 days in FY 2000, 
up from 256 days in FY 1990), at http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questcv3.htm.  Statistics on time for 
remands versus reversals and affirmances have not been recorded.  The SSAB reports that it takes about 
one year for a claim to be processed at the ALJ level.  This compares favorably to the approximately 505 
days in 2001 to process an appeal by the Appeals Council.  The average time to process a claim at the 
Appeals Process has been on a steady rise since the mid-1990s when it took just over 100 days for 
processing in 1994.  See SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, STATEMENT ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL 
SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM, (September 2001), at 7-8; SSAB, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING, supra  note 
26, at 78 (Chart 60). 
51 MASHAW ET AL. supra note 15, at 103, 126, 134-36.  Congress would of course have to amend § 205(g) 
in this regard. 
52 MASHAW ET AL. supra  note 15, at 136 (emphasis in original).   
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  These changes were never implemented, but they are still worthy of 
consideration. 53  One virtue of a closed record would be to enhance the precedential 
impact of district courts review on the agency since the open file practice undermines 
attempts to follow a case to its conclusion.  Furthermore, while the open file practice may 
have made some sense in an era where there was little legal assistance to work up the 
case at the administrative stage, today most claimants are represented by attorneys 54 who 
can be responsible for that task.  Today it seems that smart counsel for claimants are in 
effect encouraged to “game” the system by holding back key pieces of data (medical 
records, etc.) in order to gain remands at the judicial review phase.55  This tactic may 
delay the process unnecessarily (and may cost the claimant not only valuable time but 
higher attorney’s fees as well).56 
 The 1978 study took no position on whether an Article I court alternative would 
be preferable to the present system for review, except to emphasize that such a body, if 
                                                 
53 See ACUS Recommendation 90-4 (4):  
4. Closing of the Administrative Record:  The administrative hearing record should be 
closed at a set time after the evidentiary hearing. Prior to this, the ALJ should set forth for 
the claimant what information the claimant needs to produce to complete the record, issue 
any necessary subpoenas, and provide the claimant adequate time to acquire the 
information.  Requests for extension should be granted for good cause, including 
difficulty in obtaining material evidence from third parties.  The ALJ should retain the 
discretion to accept and consider pertinent information received after closure of the 
record and before the decision is issued. 
Recommendation 90-4, Social Security Disability Program Appeals Process: Supplementary 
Recommendation, available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305904.html. See also  REPORT 
OF THE DISABILITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 2 at 
12-13, 18, (urging closure of the record at the end of the ALJ stage). 
54 About 70 percent of claimants are represented before ALJs.  See SSAB, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING, 
supra  note 26, at 73 (Chart 56).  These attorneys are paid approximately  $500 million annually in attorney  
fees by SSA.  See SSAB, HOW SOCIAL SECURITY’S DISABILITY PROGRAMS CAN BE IMPROVED (Aug 1998) 
25 (citing payments of $490 million in FY 1997). 
55 SSAB, A GENDA FOR SOCIAL SECURITY supra  note 3, at 13. 
56 Attorneys are paid a percentage of the claimant’s retroactive benefits, which grow as the case moves 
through the system.   
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 created, must decide matters in a timely, independent, and professional manner.57  In the 
intervening years, much has happened, including the newly independent status of the 
SSA itself, and the case for a new approach to judicial review—or at least for renewed 
justification of the existing structure—is surely stronger than ever.  It is to the subject of 
specialized courts (both Article I and Article III) that we turn next. 
III.  Some History With Respect to Proposals for Specialized Courts 
Although the United States has largely turned to the generalist Article III district 
and circuit courts of appeals as the forums for judicial review of administrative agency 
action, there has been occasional reliance on specialized courts of review. 58   
A.  Established Specialized Courts 
One of the first such courts was the Court of Claims created in 1855 to decide 
monetary claims against the United States that previously had to be decided by 
Congress.59 It later evolved into an appellate forum, reviewing the decisions of 
Commissioners it appointed regarding contract and other non-tort claims under the 
Tucker Act.  In 1982, however, Congress gave its appellate functions to the new Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and created a new Article I trial court, the United States 
Claims Court.60  In 1992, the trial court’s name was changed to the United States Court of 
                                                 
57 See MASHAW ET AL. supra  note 15, at 146-50.  A more recent study has come down on the side of an 
Article I court structure.  See Levy, supra  note 10, at 461. 
58 For good overviews see, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 329 (1991); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication , 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 377; and 
Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 
(1990). 
59 The Supreme Court held it to be an Article I court in Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 
(1964) and again in Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933).  After Congress declared it to be an 
Article III court, the Supreme Court so held in Glidden v. Zdanok , 370 U.S. 530 (1962).  
60 See Bruff, supra , note 55 at 332-333.  The judges of the Court of Federal Claims can be removed only for 
cause and with the concurrence of a majority of the judges of the Federal Circuit.  See FED. COURTS STUDY 
COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS (July 1, 1990) (Vol. I) 170 n. 27. 
16
 
 
 
 
 Federal Claims.61  It now has sixteen judges who serve fifteen-year terms.  Its 
headquarters is in Washington, DC, but cases are heard in other locations convenient to 
the parties.62 
Another such court was the Court of Customs Appeals, created in 1909 to hear 
appeals from the Board of General Appraisers which had been created in 1890 to 
adjudicate various customs disputes.  The Board’s name was changed to the United States 
Customs Court in 1926 and it became an Article III court in 1956.  Meanwhile the Court 
of Customs Appeals became the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) in 1929 
when Congress added jurisdiction over appeals from the Commissioner of Patents which 
had previously been heard by the D.C. Circuit.  In 1980, the CCPA was also given 
appellate authority over a new Article III court, the Court of International Trade, which 
subsumed the Customs Court and also was given jurisdiction over international trade 
cases that theretofore had been heard in the district courts.63   
Finally in 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) was 
created as the only non-geographic circuit court of appeals.64  It was created as an Article 
III court and given jurisdiction of the former CCPA, (customs, trade and patent cases) 
plus a potpourri of other appeals:  appeals from the Claims Court, the International Trade 
Commission, the Merit Systems Protection Board, Boards of Contract Appeals, and a few 
                                                 
61 See Federal Court Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992). 
62 See http://www.uscourts.gov/understanding_courts/89921.htm.  
63 See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS (July 1, 1990) (Vol. 
I) 170-74, 189-92. 
64 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“DC Circuit”) also has some specialized 
jurisdiction, due to exclusive venue provisions in certain regulatory areas.  Its members may also be 
appointed without regard to residence.  However, in general it acts like an ordinary regional court of 
appeals.  
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 other agency and district court decisions.65  In 1988, the CAFC also acquired 
jurisdiction of appeals involving legal questions from the newly created Court of 
Veterans Appeals (now named the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims).  The CAFC 
sits in Washington, DC, but may convene anywhere in the United States. 
The other specialized courts that now exist66 are Article I courts.  They are labeled 
Article I rather than Article III principally because their judges do not have life tenure 
under the Constitution. 67  The Tax Court began in 1924 as the Board of Tax Appeals—a 
quasi independent entity of the Treasury Department.  In 1969, it was reshaped into an 
Article I Tax Court.68  It currently has nineteen judges who serve fifteen-year terms plus 
seventeen special trial judges appointed by the Chief Judge.69  Although the district 
courts continue to hear some cases where taxpayers have paid the tax and then seek a 
refund, the Tax Court hears 90 percent of the appeals from the Internal Revenue Service.  
Its headquarters is in Washington, DC, but it hears cases in approximately eighty cities.  
Appeals from the Tax Court go to the regional circuit courts.70 
The Court of Veterans Appeals (referred in Part I and described more fully in Part 
VII(A)(3)) was created in 1988 to provide, for the first time, judicial review in veterans’ 
benefits cases decided by the Veterans Administration (now the Department of Veterans 
                                                 
65 It was created based on the report of the Hruska Commission, which also recommended a National Court 
of Appeals.  See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS (July 1, 
1990) (Vol. I) 192. 
66 From 1910-1913, a short-lived Commerce Court was created to review decisions of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission.  Its narrow jurisdiction and charges of capture led to its early dissolution.  See id. 
at 174-76; 
67 There are some independent boards and commissions that function in a fashion similar to Article I courts 
(such as the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission and the Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Review Commission), but they will not be discussed here. 
68 See Claudia MacLachlan, The Tax Bench:  A Code Apart, 16 NAT’L L. J. No. 4, p.1 (Sept. 27, 1993). 
69 See http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/ustcweb.htm. 
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 Affairs).71  The court (renamed the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in 199872) 
hears decisions made by the Department’s presidentially appointed, administrative Board 
of Veterans Appeals; further appeals, on matters of law only, may be taken to the CAFC.  
The operation of this court is more fully described in Part VII of this Report.  
The Article I U.S. Court of Military Appeals was created by Congress in 1950 
when Congress also enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which established a 
military judicial system.73  This system was designed to give members of the military 
services, who are accused of crimes, rights paralleling those of civilians.  In 1994, the 
name of the court was changed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.  The 
court’s jurisdiction encompasses questions of law arising from trials by court-martial in 
the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard in cases where 
a death sentence is imposed, where a case is certified for review by the Judge Advocate 
General of the relevant service, or where an accused, facing a severe sentence, petitions 
and shows good cause for further review.  The five judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Armed Forces are civilians appointed for fifteen-year terms by the President with 
the advice and consent of the Senate.  The chief judge serves for five years and is 
succeeded by the next senior judge on the court.  The court is located in Washington, 
D.C.  
In addition to Article I Courts, there are two groups of Article I judges attached to 
the U.S. District Courts:  magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges.   
                                                                                                                                                 
70 Taxpayers may also seek refunds in the Claims Court—but appeals from that court go to the CAFC.  
71 Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, §301, 102 Stat. 4105, 4113 (1988). 
72 Its name was changed effective March 1, 1999, by the Ve terans’ Programs Enhancement Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-368. 
73 The information about the court is from its website, http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov. 
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 Magistrate judges are appointed by majority vote of the active district judges of 
the court to exercise jurisdiction over matters assigned by statute as well as those 
delegated by the distric t judges.74  The number of magistrate judge positions is 
determined by the Judicial Conference of the United States, based on recommendations 
of the respective district courts, the judicial councils of the circuits, and the Director of 
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.  A full-time magistrate judge serves a term 
of eight years.  Duties assigned to magistrate judges by district court judges may vary 
considerably from court to court, and as we have seen, they play a central role in the 
disposition of SSA disability cases.  At present, there are 471 full-time and 59 part-time 
magistrate judges.75 
Bankruptcy judges are appointed by the majority of judges of each U.S. circuit  to 
exercise jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters.  The number of bankruptcy judges is 
determined by Congress based on recommendations of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States.  Bankruptcy judges are appointed for fourteen-year terms.  As of the end 
of 2001, there were 324 authorized bankruptcy judgeship positions.76 
Decisions of both magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges are subject to review 
by the supervising district court judge, though an interesting aspect of the bankruptcy 
judge structure is that a statute provides that the circuit court may create a “bankruptcy 
appellate panel service” composed of bankruptcy judges of the districts in the circuit to 
                                                 
74 See generally Leslie G. Foschio, A History of the Development of the Office of United States 
Commissioner and Magistrate Judge System, 1999 FED. CTS. L. REV. 4, available at 
http://www.fclr.org/1999fedctslrev4.htm. 
75 See website for the Federal Magistrate Judges Association, available at http://www.fedjudge.org. 
76 See “Cars, Planes-and Video Cameras-Take Bankruptcy Judges to Outlying Locations,” available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/bkjtravel.html. 
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 hear appeals from individual bankruptcy judge decisions.77  Appeals heard under this 
process are heard by a panel of three members of the bankruptcy appellate panel service, 
except that a member of such service may not hear an appeal originating in the district for 
which such member is appointed or designated.78  In addition, such a procedure must be 
authorized by a majority of the district court judges of the district.79 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panels provide an example of a two-tier process, using the 
same pool of adjudicators.  The Association of [SSA] ALJs has proposed that the SSA 
ALJ corps be reconstituted into a two tier stage, modeled on the Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panels, and  that this stage be the final agency decision. 80  The ALJs’ report argues that 
since 1.3 million cases are filed with the first level bankruptcy courts, and that 500,000 
cases are filed with SSA ALJs, lessons should be drawn from the bankruptcy system.  
The report also argues that bankruptcy practitioners believe that panel decisions produce 
better products,81 that in circuits with such panels, there are far fewer appeals to the court 
of appeals,82 that bankruptcy panels produce decisions in a very short time,83 and that the 
potential for service on such panels improves judicial morale.84  While the SSA ALJ 
study’s conclusions on this point have not been reviewed thoroughly, this is a proposal 
                                                 
77 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1).  See Tisha Morris, Establishment of Bankruptcy Panels Under the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1994:  Historical Background and Sixth Circuit Analysis, 26 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 1501 
(1996) and Thomas E. Carlson, The Case for Bankruptcy Appeals Panels, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 545, 575 
(finding the panels to be “an unqualified success). 
78 28 U.S.C § 158(b)(1)(5). 
79 28 U.S.C § 158(b)(1)(6). 
80 REPORT ON NEW INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCY, supra  note 10, at 40-43. 
81 Id. at 42, citing Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., The Case Against Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 4 GEO. 
MASON. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995). 
82 Id. at 42, citing Morris, supra  note 74, at 1517-19. 
83 Id. at 42, citing Morris, supra  note 74, at 1530 (giving the average disposition time of 75 days). 
84 Id. at 43, citing Morris, supra  note 74, at 1509. 
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 worth considering given the current extensive delays at, and limited policy review by, 
the Appeals Council. 
B. Other Recent Proposals for Specialized Courts Relating to Social Security85 
In 1971, the “Ash Council”86 recommended the creation of a specialized appellate 
court to hear appeals from restructured transportation, power, and securities agencies.  
                                                 
85 It should be noted that there have also been several specialized courts made up of sitting  judges.  These 
include two “emergency” courts.  The Emergency Court of Appeals (“ECA”) was created in 1942 to handle 
appeals from the wartime price administrators.  The court was staffed by sitting federal judges from 
throughout the nation appointed by the Chief Justice.  Its constitutionality was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in 1944 in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 437-38.  It stayed in existence until 1961 to handle 
appeals from various post-war and Korean War related programs.  See FED.  COURTS STUDY COMM., 
WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS (July 1, 1990) (Vol. I) 176-81.  In 1971, economic 
conditions led to similar wage and price controls and the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals was 
created.  It is also composed of sitting judges and its size has varied over the years (e.g., 20 in 1982 and 12 
in 1989).  See id. at 182.  A few years later it was given jurisdiction over reviews of energy program 
disputes.  The court was dissolved in 1993 at the request of the Judicial Conference.  Another temporary 
highly specialized court consisting of sitting judges was created in 1973—the Special Court created by the 
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973.  The court was set up to adjudicate consolidated claims 
stemming from the railroad reorganization that led to the creation of Conrail.  See id. 185-86. 
In 1978 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act created a special court made up of seven sitting district 
court judges from different circuits, appointed by the Chief Justice to hear applications for and to grant 
orders approving electronic surveillance anywhere within the United States.  There is also a three-judge 
appeals court made up of sitting district or appeals judges to which denials of wiretap orders may be 
appealed, with certiorari review (under seal) to the Supreme Court.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1803.  According to 
one critic of the court, as of November 2000, it received 7,539 applications to authorize electronic 
surveillance within the United States from the Justice Department on behalf of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the National Security Agency.  In the name of national security, the court has approved 
all but one of these requests.  Each of these decisions was reached in secret, with no published orders, 
opinions, or public record.  See Philip Colangelo, The Secret FISA Court:  Rubber Stamping Our Rights, 
COVERT ACTION Q. (Nov. 27, 2000), available at http://www.rense.com/general5/fisacourt.htm. The two 
courts are known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts. See FED.  COURTS STUDY COMM., 
WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS (July 1, 1990) (Vol. I) 187-89. 
In 1996 an Alien Terrorist Removal Court was created pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996.  Pub. L. No. 104-132.  This court, which is made up of five sitting district court judges 
from different circuits, appointed by the Chief Justice, conducts proceedings based on applications brought 
by the Attorney General to determine whether an alien should be removed from the United States on 
grounds of being a terrorist. 
Also, the 1978 Ethics in Government Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521 § 602 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 49) 
(establishing special division of the DC Circuit to appoint special prosecutor; amended to substitute term 
“independent counsel” in 1983) created a special Court of Appeals “Division to Appoint Independent 
Counsels.” 28 U.S.C § 49.  The statute specified that one of the three shall be a member of the DC Circuit 
and that not more than one judge or justice or senior or retired judge or justice may be named to such 
division from a particular court.  See id.  Under this statute, three judges or justices were assigned for two-
year periods to a division of the United States Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit for the purpose of 
appointing independent counsels.  This  division ceased to exist with the non-renewal of the Independent 
Counsel statute. 
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 The Administrative Conference of the U.S. issued a statement in 1971 opposing this 
particular proposal on a number of grounds that might be relevant here, though SSA 
decisions are not the same sort of regulatory decisions.87  Such concerns include the 
benefits of having generalist judges provide scrutiny of agency action as to its fairness 
and consistency with statutory norms, the danger that a narrowly specialized reviewing 
court might become or appear to become identified with the agency, and the risk that the 
appointments to such a court would pose a problem of adequate public oversight.88   
In 1977, the tenor of the debate about the need for specialized courts changed 
with the publication of “The Needs of the Federal Courts” by the Department of Justice 
Committee on Revision of the Federal Judicial System, chaired by Robert Bork.  The 
“Bork Report” identified a crisis of case volume in the district courts and urged the 
creation of new non-Article III tribunals in the district courts to handle certain types of 
cases characterized by relatively unsophisticated, repetitious factual issues that rarely 
give rise to important legal questions.  Among these were social security cases.89   
The ABA House of Delegates in August 1982 opposed creation of an Article I 
Social Security Court for the reasons described in Part V of this Report.  This resolution 
was sponsored by the ABA’s Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly and 
                                                                                                                                                 
86 THE PRESIDENT ’S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXEC. ORG., A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK:  REPORT ON 
SELECTED REGULATORY AGENCIES (1971) (chaired by businessman Roy L. Ash).  See Nathaniel L. 
Nathanson, The Administrative Court Proposal , 57 VA. L. REV. 996 (1971). 
87 ACUS, Statement 1, Views of the Administrative Conference on the “Report on Selected Independent 
Regulatory Agencies” of the President’s Advisory Council on Executive Organization, 38 Fed. Reg. 19,974 
(July 23, 1973). 
88 See also  the ACUS-sponsored article, David Currie & Frank Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal 
Administrative Action:  Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 62-88 (1975) (critiquing 
proposals for specialized courts). 
89 After listing examples of these types of cases, the Committee stated, “These matters have great individual 
and social significance but the questions they raise could be handled as effectively and justly by trained 
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 Commission on the Mentally Disabled.90  In 1989, the Sloan Foundation commissioned 
a review of the SSA appeals process that, among other things, strongly recommended the 
creation of a Social Security Court.91  The report recommended that the new court be an 
Article III court, and that appeals from the court go to the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit. 
In 1990, another thorough study of the SSA appeals process, by Professor Richard 
Levy, recommended the creation of an Article I “Court of Disability Appeals” (created by 
expanding the jurisdiction of the then-named Court of Veterans Appeals) which would 
substitute for the review responsibilities of both the Appeals Council (which would be 
assigned policymaking functions) and the district courts.  Appeals from the disability 
court would mirror those from the veterans court, in that they would be limited to legal 
questions.  The administrative law judge corps would be made independent of the SSA as 
well.  Under Professor Levy’s proposal, the SSA would be entitled to seek review in the 
disability court.92 
Also in that same year, a special Federal Courts Study Committee, undertook a 
comprehensive study of the entire federal judiciary.  The Committee, consisting of a 
select panel of fifteen federal judges, Members of Congress and distinguished lawyers, 
formally recommended that: 
                                                                                                                                                 
administrative judges as by Article III judges burdened with the pressing business of a general criminal and 
civil jurisdiction.”  Report at page 9. 
90 Proposed resolution on file with authors. 
91 See, e.g., FREDERICK B. ARNER, ALFRED B. SLOAN FOUND., A MODEL DISABILITY STRUCTURE FOR THE 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 110 (Sept. 1989) (“Of all the suggestions for change in the various 
levels of adjudication, I believe recommending the creation of a Social Security Court is the most clear cut 
and easiest to make.”) 
92 See Levy, supra note 10 at 512-37. 
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 Congress should create a new structure for adjudicating disability claims under 
the Social Security Act:  hearings before administrative law judges with 
adequate institutional independence, whose decisions could be appealed to 
a new Article I Court of Disability Claims, with review in the courts of 
appeal limited to constitutional claims and to pure issues of law. 93 
 
This report concluded that:  “[t]he principal issues in most Social Security 
disability cases are factual and technical.  Thus it is best to concentrate adjudicative 
resources at the administrative level and create a new appellate court that will attract 
competent specialists in disability law.”94   
It also stated its belief that the new court “will provide a more thorough and 
expert examination of facts than federal district court can provide, given the other 
demands on their time.”95  It also suggested that Congress may wish to consider 
expanding the jurisdiction of such a court to include claims now handled by the Court of 
Appeals for Veterans Claims—which it said might provide a good model for the 
proposed new Court of Disability Appeals.  It concluded that “[t]he enhanced authority 
and prestige of such a court would attract the ablest specialists in the field of disability 
law, and the broader the court’s jurisdiction, the more it will alleviate the Article III 
judiciary’s disability caseload.”96  As for the Appeals Council, which would lose its 
appellate adjudicative responsibilities under the proposal, the Committee suggested it be 
reconstituted “as an agency to promulgate the regulations that guide the adjudication of 
Social Security disability cases” in the manner that the Occupational Safety and Health 
                                                 
93 REP . OF THE FED. COURTS STUDY COMM. 55 (Apr. 2, 1990). 
94 Id. at 56. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 57. 
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 Administration does for the independent Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission (OSHRC).97 
Most recently the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts 
of Appeals, chaired by Justice Byron White in December 1998 issued a report that said 
Congress should seriously consider proposals for an Article I Social Security Court, 
perhaps with exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the CAFC on the same basis as for 
veterans’ appeals—review limited to constitutional and statutory questions.98 
 
IV.  Proponents’ Arguments for a Social Security Court 
As discussed above, proponents have cited relief for the Article III district courts 
as well as benefits for the social security adjudication process itself.  The Bork Report 
pointed to the dramatic increase in federal district court filings of social security cases 
and argued that this has significantly added to the overall backlog in district courts (and 
presumably in the courts of appeals).  Proponents also argue that disability filings have 
created painful delays in resolution of claims by district courts since these cases must 
compete with all the other civil and criminal business in the federal courts. 
Another alleged problem is that of non-uniformity, which is a function of the 
number of district court and court of appeals judges passing on these cases.  Non-
uniformity, in turn, leads to difficulties in administration of the program at the agency 
level.  A specialized court could create uniform substantive norms that would be more 
easily communicated throughout the SSA system. 
                                                 
97 This recommendation was not unanimous.  Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) dissented and three other 
members issued a counter proposal which would substitute a Benefits Review Board of the Appeals 
Council, maintain district court review, but limit court of appeals review to questions of law.  Id. at 58-59.  
98 COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT , submitted 
to the President and the Congress pursuant to Pub. L. No. 105-119, (Dec. 18, 1998) p.74. 
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 Finally, proponents argue that the vast majority of these cases, involve only 
factual issues.  It is inefficient to require a generalist Article III judge to attempt to 
evaluate medical and other evidence to determine if the administrative decision is 
supported by substantial evidence.  It is far better, proponents argue, to have 
decisionmaking in an administrative forum that would obtain experience and expertise in 
the evaluation of the disability program.99 
A.  Caseload Concerns 
The 1990 Federal Courts Study Committee stressed the effect of SSA disability 
claims appeals on the courts.  The Committee’s working papers mentioned that such 
appeals constituted a significant portion of the district courts’ workload—ranging from 
5.3 percent to 11 percent from 1983 to 1988, and 3.0 percent to 4.2 percent of the court of 
appeals caseload.100  Equally persuasive to the Committee was that complaints received 
from federal judges “were virtually unanimous in mentioning Social Security cases.  
Judges apparently find these cases burdensome, but feel that their efforts contribute little 
to improving administration in this area.”101 
                                                 
99 See, e.g., ARNER, supra  note 89 at 110-125 (arguing for the creation of an Article III Social Security 
Court). 
100 See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS (July 1, 1990) (Vol. 
I) 285.  The court of appeals judges were also surveyed on their attitude toward specialized courts.  Only 52 
opined that additional specialized courts would be desirable as opposed to 80 who said it would be 
undesirable.  However, when respondents were asked “if you favor more specialized courts, what areas 
would be most appropriate (check all that apply)?” the responses were Social Security (64), Tax (45), 
Administrative (30) and Other (16).  Id. (Vol. II) (“Survey of Circuit Judges”) (unpaginated).  No similar 
question was included in the Survey of District Judges. 
101 Id. at 285-86. 
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 It seems clear that, as Professor Levy concluded, “the substantial judicial 
resources allocated to disability determinations are not used in a cost-effective 
manner.”102  He points out: 
Instrumentally, the added layers of judicial review might correct some of 
the random good faith errors that inevitably slip through the complex 
disability determination process.  On the other hand, judicial review is 
illsuited to perform this corrective function.  Judges have no particular 
expertise concerning the technical medical and vocational judgments 
necessary to determine disability.  Even the legal questions involved in 
disability determinations are usually highly technical issues on which 
courts normally defer to agency expertise.103 
 
Moreover, “[g]iven the recurring backlogs and delays in the administrative disability 
determination process, securing judicial relief from an erroneous benefit decision is a 
time consuming process at best, and many meritorious appeals may be lost to 
attrition.”104  
Chief Judge Pierce Lively of the Sixth Circuit in a 1986 interview summarized 
this view of the social security appeals process from the perspective of the federal bench: 
When you examine carefully what is involved in the Social Security 
appeal, it becomes clear, to me at least, that we are not using our judicial 
resources very wisely. . . . There is no new hearing after the administrative 
law judge’s action.  The magistrate makes a recommendation, and the 
district judge is required to review that same administrative record de 
novo before either accepting or rejecting the magistrate’s 
recommendations.  This is all done on cross-motions for summary 
judgment.  If the answer is still “no benefits,” the claimant may appeal to 
the court of appeals fo r his or her circuit.  Three judges are then required 
to read the administrative record, and in some cases hear oral argument.  
In most cases, the only question from the time the proceedings end in the 
Social Security Administration is whether the decision is supported by 
substantial evidence.  All of the judges are merely reviewing factual 
                                                 
102 Levy, supra  note 10, at 508. 
103 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
104 Id. 
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 matters, and a very large portion of each record consists of medical records. 
 
It seems to me that a special court could quickly acquire some expertise in 
this field.  I don’t denigrate the importance of Social Security cases to the 
litigants; like all cases they are the most impotant [sic] thing in the world 
to the parties involved.  But I do think the claimants would get much faster 
answers in a special court than they now do, being required to take their 
turn on the crowded district court and courts of appeals dockets.105   
 
Today, there are even more reasons to believe the disability caseload will 
continue to increase.  As noted at the outset, the aging of the baby boom generation will 
likely produce an upsurge of applications and disputes.106  Moreover, SSA has recently 
resumed its program of continuing disability reviews of existing beneficiaries, after 
Congress authorized $4.3 billion for this purpose for FY 1996 to FY 2002.107  CDRs 
tripled from about 600,000 in 1997 to 1.8 million in 2000.108  Because CDRs can lead to 
a termination of benefits in some cases, an upsurge in hearing requests, and, eventually, a 
higher tide of appeals to the federal courts might be expected, as happened with a similar 
policy in the 1980s.109  On the other hand, the impact of CDRs on the judicial caseload 
                                                 
105 Interview with Chief Judge Pierce Lively, 18 THIRD BRANCH 1, 5 (June 1986). 
106 See text at note 5, supra . 
107 SSAB, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING, supra  note 26, at 28. 
108 See id. 
109 One critic of Social Security Court proposals in the 1980s stated that: 
In the 1983 fiscal year, the [SSA] Office of Hearings and Appeals received over 134,000 
requests for hearings in Continuing Disability Review (CDR) cases, accounting for 36.4 
percent of the requests received.  The SSA’s own reinstatement statistics bear witness to 
an unconscionably high rate of wrongful terminations during the period.  By March 1984, 
federal officials were reporting that over 470,000 people had been removed from the 
disability rolls in the preceding three years, 160,000 had already been reinstated after 
appeals, and another 120,000 cases were pending.  Suddenly, the administrative system 
had to cope with the influx of hundreds of thousands of terminated disability recipients 
appealing their cases. 
Robert E. Rains, A Specialized Court for Social Security?  A Critique of Recent Proposals, 15 Fla. St. U. L. 
Rev. 1, 7-8 (1987) (footnotes omitted).  It is no coincidence that filings in federal district court peaked at 
27,500 in FY 1984, then dropped to 20,000 in FY 1985, and to just over 10,000 in FY 1986, after the CDR 
program was terminated. 
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 will be a function of the number of actual terminations that result from the review 
process, and  it is doubtful that the SSA would permit terminations to reach the levels that 
occurred in the 1980s.110 
But whatever the cause, it is clear that district court filings in social security cases 
are on the upswing again—13,059 in FY 1999111 and over 15,000 in FY 2000.112  The 
number of new disability cases filed in the federal courts nearly tripled between 1990 and 
2000.113 
B.  Uniformity Concerns 
Proponents of a Social Security Court also focus on the problem of inconsistent 
application of the law, both vertically within the different levels of the disability 
adjudication system, and horizontally in different regions and judicial districts.  The 
concerns are voiced, for example by the National Association of Disability Examiners 
(“NADE”), a professional organization, many of whose members are employed in the 
state Disability Determination Service (“DDS”) offices and are directly involved in 
processing claims for Social Security disability benefits.  In Congressional testimony, the 
NADE President summarized her concerns about the lack of uniformity: 
Disability decisions are not made in a nationally uniform and consistent 
manner.  While to some extent this has always been true, it has become 
increasingly more pronounced in recent years.  For several reasons, we are 
concerned that this trend will continue.  New policies developed by SSA, 
both in response to, and independent of, court decisions and other 
litigation, have required that increasingly more weight be given to the 
subjective complaints of disability applicants.  Similar impairments will 
                                                 
110 See discussion at note 10 and accompanying text concerning the reasons why SSA’s independent status 
was meant to prevent a return to the 1980s CDR situation. 
111 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 117, Table 2.F10 
(2000).  
112 SSAB, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING, supra  note 26, at 84. 
113 Id.  
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 affect different individuals in different ways.  Assessing these subjective 
complaints necessarily has added to the growing belief that there is a 
general lack of consistency in what the public believes should be a 
uniform national program. 
 
Social Security lacks a clear and uniform quality review process that 
would provide consistent, meaningful feedback to all decision-makers.  
Quality assurance reviews and the “adjudicative climate” under which 
claims are reviewed, are inconsistent and reflective of—and convoluted by 
–politics and/or litigation.  Regulations are frequently promulgated and 
implemented before operating procedures, instructions and other tools 
have been developed.  Decisions made by Administrative Law Judges are 
driven by court decisions while decisions made in the DDSs are controlled 
by program directives issued by SSA. . . . 
*** 
In order to increase the consistency and uniformity of disability decisions, 
the Social Security Administration must become truly “one SSA”. . . . .114 
NADE has made numerous recommendations concerning SSA administration, but 
the organization also comes down squarely in favor of a new court: 
NADE has long supported the establishment of a Social Security Court.  
The development of—and decision on—an individual’s claim should not 
be dependent upon their residence or judicial jurisdiction.  The ever-
increasing complexity of disability claims, and the growth of medical 
technology, makes the need for a specialized court, with expertise in these 
matters, a necessity. 115 
 
 In addition, Frederick Arner has emphasized that uniformity is a basis for 
preferring a Social Security Court, although be ultimately favored such a court under 
Article III rather than Article I.116 
V.  Opponents’ Arguments Against a Social Security Court 
Led by claimant representatives and senior citizen organizations, opponents 
counter with various arguments.  They claim that the impact of social security cases on 
                                                 
114 Statement of Sue Heflin, President, National Association of Disability Examiners, Testimony Before the 
Subcommittee on Social Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means Hearing on Social Security 
Disability Program’s Challenges and Opportunities 107th Cong. (June 28, 2001) available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/socsec/107cong/6-28-01/6-28hefl.htm 
115 Id. 
116 See ARNER, supra  note 89, at 110-14 (citing other sources for uniformity of decisionmaking). 
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 the federal court backlog is overstated.  They argue that the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts weights these cases at approximately one-fourth the level of an average case 
and that many are, for practical purposes, decided by magistrate judges.  They also claim 
that SSA’s policies of nonacquiescence, dilatory requests for remands, and other policies 
are responsible for the high caseloads and that it would be improper to “reward” SSA for 
these activities by creating a Social Security Court (“SSC”).  This assumes that an SSC 
would be more partial to SSA than current district courts, which is hard to predict.  But it 
may not be a bad assumption given that district courts have been remanding or reversing 
SSA denials in over 50 percent of the appeals,117 notwithstanding that the scope of review 
is not de novo but is based on the supposedly deferential “substantial evidence” test.  The 
opponents have argued that it is this reversal rate that is the real motivation for moving 
cases out of the district courts and that the nonuniformity is not that great among districts 
or circuits.118  On the other hand, independent Article I courts may be no less demanding.  
The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims produces at least partially favorable results for 
claimants in 46 percent of its cases,119 and this is after a administrative process that is 
supposed to resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the veteran. 
A related argument is that the SSC will become a rubber stamp for SSA.  The 
concern is that such a court will be faced with low staffing, high caseloads, and an 
inevitable monotony or redundancy in the cases, and, thus, will become jaded and 
                                                 
117 While district courts reverse SSA outright in relatively few cases, the remand rate has grown from 37  
percent in 1996 to 48 percent in 2000.  See SSAB, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING, supra  note 26, at 85; see 
also  notes 44-46 and accompanying text, supra . 
118 It is evident that there is significant variation among district and circuits.  See infra, Appendix B (e.g. 
District of West Virginia 3.6 percent reversals; Northern District of California 1 percent reversals; and 
Eastern District of New York 27.8 percent reversals, etc.). 
119 See text at note 186, infra. 
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 eventually act as the SSA Appeals Council purportedly does now—routinely dismissing 
appeals. 
The rest of opponents’ arguments boil down to the benefits of generalist judges, 
even assuming the widespread use of magistrate judges to decide most of these cases 
now; the need to modify the administrative procedures of SSA before tinkering with 
judicial review; the unfairness of giving social security claimants “second class justice;” 
and specific deficiencies of the SSC proposals, such as the lessened independence of 
Article I judges, the lack of availability of class-action procedures or injunctive relief, 
and the cost of traveling to the hearings. 
Opponents also counter the uniformity argument, not by questioning its goals, but 
by arguing that the nonuniformity is overstated.  Professor Rains argued that the 
Congress and the Supreme Court can redress these problems.120  Moreover he argues that 
the problem has largely been caused by the SSA. 
Nonuniformity exists largely between the SSA and the circuits rather than 
among the circuits themselves.  The reality is that SSA objects to 
relatively uniform adverse decisions largely brought about in recent years 
by the SSA’s obstinance, or . . . its lawlessness. 
 
The cry of nonuniformity is a smokescreen.  One can only suspect that the 
administration favors the establishment of the Social Security Court in the 
hope that such a court would abandon settled precedent and create new 
precedent more favorable to the Social Security Administration. 121 
 
As can be seen from the above quotation, there is also a political subcurrent to all 
this, reflecting the hopes and fears surrounding the appointment process for the new 
court.  This reflects the concerns that a President will suddenly have the opportunity to 
                                                 
120 Rains, supra note 106, at 23-24. 
121 Id. at 24.  One wonders whether this fear couldn’t be assuaged by legislative direction to a new Article I 
court to follow established precedent unless extraordinary reasons for departing from it are given. 
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 appoint the entire initial membership of the new court.122  A more subtle concern 
transcends concerns relating to a particular President.  It relates to agency “capture”—
that the nomination process might be influenced by groups (or DOJ itself) which also 
would have similar influence in the selection of the SSA Commissioner and therefore the 
SSA Court might be staffed with judges who share the same policy views as the SSA 
Commissioner, thus making it more pro-agency. 
As Professor Revesz has written: 
For example, under a scheme of specialized courts, the Justice Department 
can strive for a perfect identity between the views of a nominee to a 
hypothetical Court of Social Security Appeals and those of the Social 
Security Administration.  If, in contrast, the responsibility for judicial 
review of this agency’s decisions remains in the generalist courts, the 
Justice Department would have to consider whether a nominee that is 
desirable from the perspective of the Social Security Administration is 
also desirable from the standpoint of, say, the Department’s own interest 
in the enforcement of federal criminal law.  It is unlikely that any 
individual would be ideal from all perspectives. 
 
Of course, the influence of the Justice Department is likely to be the 
strongest, and the biasing effect most pronounced, where the Department 
faces a weak private bar, as is true, for example, in Social Security cases.  
There, the bar is unlikely to provide strong counter-weight to the 
Department’s interest in securing sympathetic judges on the specialized 
court.  In contrast, where the Department faces a strong private bar, the 
effect will be considerably mitigated, and may in fact pull in the opposite 
direction as a result of the group’s capture of the nomination process.123  
 
Professor Revesz has also acknowledged the concern that the judges on the SSC 
would have an overly narrow perspective: 
[S]pecialized judges tend to come from relatively narrow segments of the 
profession and are therefore less likely than generalist judges to have been 
                                                 
122 Although, presumably the Congress could add a political party affiliation requirement as it has done for 
multi-member administrative agencies.  See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice, 
The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1099, 1137 (2000). 
123 Revesz, supra  note 55, at 1152. 
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 exposed to a wide range of legal issues.  Moreover, because they do not 
adjudicate cases outside their area of specialization, they are also unlikely 
to broaden their outlook once on the bench.  Thus, in general, specialized 
judges will be less skilled than their generalist counterparts at applying 
concepts from other areas of law, even if the relevant reference points 
were brought to their attention. 
 
This problem may well be exacerbated by the bar that can be expected to 
form around a specialized court.  Experience with specialized courts 
suggests that such courts will develop idiosyncratic procedures.  When a 
court’s procedures are not common to those of other courts, the high cost 
of becoming familiar with such procedures provides serious disincentives 
for lawyers to practice before the specialized court only occasionally.  
Thus, lawyers who practice before specialized courts will be less likely 
than those who practice before generalist courts to work daily with a broad 
cross-section of federal law. 124   
 
But he qualified his opposition to specialized courts where decisions of 
such courts are reviewable by the generalist courts of appeals. 
However, the negative effects of specialized courts identified in this 
Article do not apply if the courts are subject to review, as of right, by the 
generalist, regional circuits.  Then, the specialized court would be 
overseen by a forum that does not exhibit the systemic biases that are 
likely to be found in specialized courts; that is functionally well suited and 
capable of drawing insights from other areas of law, thereby promoting the 
coherence of federal law; and that is capable of engaging in dialogue 
designed to improve the quality of legal rules. 
 
Thus, the negative effects discussed in this Article do not apply to . . . the 
Tax Court, OSHRC, and [the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 
Commission] (FMSHRC)].  Similarly, the negative effects would not 
apply to the proposed Social Security Court, as long as its decisions were 
subject to review as of right in the regional circuits.125  
                                                 
124 Id. at 1163-64 (footnote omitted). 
125 Id. at 1165-66 (footnotes omitted).  On the other hand, with respect to the proposals for a Social Security 
Court, he has cautioned that one often overlooked benefit is that the courts have often used SSA courts to 
propound important legal doctrines: 
Clearly, this is not the place to analyze competing claims, but it is relevant to recall that 
such fundamental issues as the scope of class actions or of the injunctive power of the 
federal courts have been resolved in the context of Social Security cases, which some 
believe to be relatively routine and therefore unworthy of the generalist courts. 
Id. at 1170 (footnotes omitted). 
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VI.  Key Statistics 
In general, about two million claimants apply for disability annually.  
Approximately 400,000 are granted benefits at the state DDS initial intake level and 
another 75,000 on reconsideration. 126  Those who continue with their appeals then 
proceed to the ALJ phase. 
A.  ALJ Hearing Stage 
The SSA adjudication system is probably the largest system of trial-type 
adjudication in the world.  In FY 1999, the Office of Hearings and Appeals (“OHA”) 
reported 524,644 case filings.  In FY 2000, the number dropped by 3 percent to 507,010.  
This compares to a dramatically lower figure in 1969 of 27,000.  ALJ dispositions have 
exceeded filings in recent years, with 596,999 in FY 1999 and 584,546 in FY 2000.  
However, the pending caseload remains quite high, with 239,370 at the end of FY 
2000.127 
Cases decided by ALJs reverse claim denials by the State DDS offices at a 
remarkably high rate.  Favorable ALJ decisions to claimants were 66 percent in 2000, and 
were over 70 percent from 1990-95.  But variations by state ranged from 86 percent 
(Maine) to 35 percent (DC).128  This reversal rate is especially high in Disability 
                                                 
126 See SSAB, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING, supra  note 26, at 86 (Chart 67) (reproduced in Appendix B 
of this Report, infra). 
127 These figures are from SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, ANNUAL STATISTICAL 
SUPPLEMENT 117, Table 2.F9 (2000).  For FY 2003, the estimate is for the pending caseload to rise to 
537,000.  See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, FISCAL YEAR 2003 JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR 
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 104 (forthcoming 2002). 
128 See SSAB, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING, supra  note 26, at 70. 
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 Insurance cases, in which claimants receive favorable decisions in over 75 percent of 
cases; in Supplemental Security Income (SSI) cases, the figure is just over 50 percent.129 
The percentage of DI and SSI claimants represented by attorneys at ALJ hearings 
has nearly doubled (to 70 percent) since 1977 and representation by non-attorneys has 
gone from about 10 percent to 18 percent.  Only about 12 percent of all claimants are 
unrepresented.130 
The average processing time in FY 2000 at the ALJ stage was 274 days, down 
from a peak of 386 days in 1997.131 
B.  Appeals Council 
Appeals Council receipts have fluctuated at slightly over 100,000:  110,159 in FY 
1998; 115,150 in FY 1999; and 100,950 in FY 2000.  As with the hearing level, the 
Appeals Council has been able to increase its disposition rate with 101,877 dispositions 
in FY 1998; 91,173 in FY 1999; and 134,191 in FY 2000.  Pending cases at the Appeals 
went from 120,548 at the end of FY 1998 to 144,525 at the end of FY 1999, to 113,323 at 
the end of FY 2000.132 
Not all of the cases the Appeals Council receives are requests for review from 
claimants, however.  In FY 2000, for example, the dispositions listed above represented 
106,358 requests for review; 9,813 court remands; 14,363 reviews of new court cases; 
and 5,360 quality assurance and special reviews.133 
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131 Id. at 81. 
132 See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT , 117, Table 
2.F11 (2000). 
133 See SSAB, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING, supra  note 26, at 76. 
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 In 2000, about 76 percent of the Appeals Council decisions were denials of 
review.  About 19 percent were remands (60 percent of which ultimately result in 
allowances), and a small percentage were allowances or dismissals.134 
Requests to the Appeals Council to review ALJ decisions increased 54 percent 
between 1994 and 2000, and average processing time more than quadrupled from 
approximately 115 days to 505 days.135 
C.  Courts 
1. District court filings 
Challenges to SSA decisions in federal district court rose steadily in the 1980s 
and then dropped significantly in the 1990s, only to begin rising steadily again in the last 
few years.  In FY 1980, there were 7,814 SSA cases filed in the federal district courts.  
By FY 1984, the high water mark, the total had reached 27,903.  This large number has 
been attributed to the aggressive “continuing disability review” (“CDR”) policy and non-
acquiescence policies pursued by SSA from 1981-84.136  By FY 1990, with the 
termination of the CDR policies, the caseload had quieted down to approximately 5,600.  
It then see-sawed from approximately 12,000 in FY 1993 to approximately 8,500 in FY 
1996.  At that point, SSA began a program of increased CDRs again137 and the caseload 
began to rise fairly steadily again starting in 1997.138  According to the Administrative 
Office for the U.S. Courts, in the one-year period ending September 30, 1997, the total 
                                                 
134 Id. at 77. 
135 Id. at 78. 
136 Rains, supra  note 106, at 7-8. 
137 See SSAB, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING, supra  note 26, at 28. 
138 As stated above, CDRs may not be a significant factor.  See the discussion in the text at note 107. 
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 number of SSA cases commenced in the district court was 13,605.139  In the next year, 
the number jumped to 14,552,140 then dropped slightly to 13,920141 but then, in the most 
recent reported one-year period (ending September 30, 2000), it rose to its highest level 
since the 1980s—15,829.142  In 2000, fifteen district courts reported over 300 cases.143  
The Eastern District of Kentucky led the way with 831.  
In FY 2000, the district courts remanded 48 percent of the cases and reversed 
another 6.15 percent outright.  About 60 percent of remands eventually become 
allowances.144  The average processing time at the federal district court stage is about 18 
months.145 
 These statistics are not uniform throughout the district courts.  The data shows 
that district courts have widely different approaches to disability appeals.  Looking at 
districts with over 100 cases in FY 2000, there were two districts (N.D.N.Y. and N.D. 
Tex.) that did not grant a single allowance for disability claimants.  At the other end of 
the scale, W.D.Ark. granted 24.62 percent and S.D.N.Y. granted 27.87 percent of 
claimants an allowance.146   The federal district court average allowance rate is 6.15 
                                                 
139 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REP . OF THE DIR., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 1997, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicial_business/contents.html.  Table S-9. 
140 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REP . OF THE DIR., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 1998, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/dirrpt98/index.html.  Table S-9. 
141 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REP . OF THE DIR., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 1999, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus1999/supps.html.  Table S-9. 
142 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra  note 26, Table S-9. 
143 See id. These included E-NY, E-PA, W-PA, MD, W-VA, S-WV, E-KY, N-OH, E-TN, E-AR, E-CA, C-
CA, E-WA, N-AL, and M-FL 
144 SSAB, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING, supra  note 26, at 86.  For similar figures for FY 1999, see also 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN,  ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 
117, Table 2.F10 (2000). 
145 SSAB, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING, supra  note 26, at 103. 
146 See infra, Appendix A.  An allowance is a reversal of the Appeals Council decis ion resulting in the 
payment of benefits to the claimant without a remand.  The federal district court civil caseload dataset used 
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 percent.  The actual allowance rate for claimants after an appeal to the federal courts is 
higher than 6.15 percent since 48 percent of cases are remanded and 60 percent of such 
cases result in grants by the Appeals Council.  This means  that approximately 28.8 
percent of appeals to the district courts result in an allowance after remand (3,904 of 
13,681 cases).  When added to the 6.15 percent allowance rate, this ultimately results in 
awards for about 35 percent of claimants who appeal Appeals Council denials to district 
courts.  (Of course, the remanded cases would experience a delayed payment compared 
to those directly awarded an allowance by the district court.) 
 There are no data on the remand rate per district, but one might assume that such 
variations in the allowance rate would imply that the remand rate would display similar 
variations.147  It is thus hard not to conclude that disability cases receive non-uniform 
treatment among districts. 
2. Court of appeals filings 
 Statistics on SSA cases in the courts of appeals are harder to find.  Total appeals 
from district courts to courts of appeals in SSA cases were 699 in FY 1997; 862 in FY 
1998, 904 in FY 1999; and 845 in FY 2000.148  This last figure represents about 2.5 
percent of the total appeals of civil cases lodged in the courts of appeals.  In FY 2000, 
there were 942 SSA cases terminated in the cour ts of appeals, including 726 
                                                                                                                                                 
to compile these figures is provided free on the Internet by Professors Theodore Eisenberg and Kevin M. 
Clermont of Cornell University Law School.  See Eisenberg & Clermont, supra  note 47. 
147 See infra, Appendix A. 
148 Data is from Table B-1A, contained in ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REP . OF THE DIR., 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1997-2000, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html.  This compares with 151 cases appealed from the CAVC 
to the CAFC in the year ending March 31, 2001, see ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTIC [SIC], Table B-8 (Mar. 31, 2001), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2001/tables/b08mar01.pdf.  See also Levy, supra , note 10 at 480, 
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 determinations on the merits.  Of these, only 175 required oral argument, the rest were 
decided after submission of briefs only.149  No data is available on reversal rates or time 
frames for review at the court of appeals stage. 
VII.  Veterans Benefits Appeals Process 
The process for judicial review for veterans’ disability benefits claims dates back 
only to 1988.150  Before that no judicial review was available.  It is instructive to describe 
the post-1988 process in some detail, because the process now involves an administrative 
adjudication of benefits claims, followed by review by an Article I court, with review of 
legal issues by the Article III Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  
A.  Basic Review Structure 
 A claimant veteran first submits an application for benefits.  If the claimant is 
dissatisfied with the benefits determination by the rating board that initially decides the 
claim, there are three main appeals levels:  (1) review by the Board of Veteran’s Appeals 
(“BVA”); (2) review by the Article I U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 
(“CAVC”);151 and (3) review by the Article III Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(“CAFC”) on questions of law only.  Of course, certiorari review by the U.S. Supreme 
Court is available but there has only been one case accepted by the Court since 1988.152  
It is also possible for the veteran to refile the claim.153 
                                                                                                                                                 
providing a table of filings in the courts of appeals from 1965 to 1988.  Until 1976, the number never 
exceeded 300.  The high water mark was 1,204 in 1984.  By 1988, the number had dropped to 992.   
149 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra  note 26, Table B-1A, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/appendices /b01asep00.pdf. 
150 See Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, §301, 102 Stat. 4105, 4113 (1988). 
151 The court was named the U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals (COVA) until March 1, 1999.  See CAVC, 
ABOUT THE COURT , available at http://www.vetapp.uscourts.gov/AboutCourt/CourtFacts.asp. 
152 Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994) (affirming CAVC and Federal Circuit decisions holding that the 
VA incorrectly required a fault requirement as a condition of VA disability payments when a veteran’s 
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 1.  The initial filing 
 When a veteran initially files a Compensation or Pension disability (“C&P”) 
claim, the Veterans Benefits Administration (“VBA”) makes the initial decision 
regarding claims.  The VBA is divided into 58 regional offices154 and has a staff of 
12,008.155  The VBA makes decisions regarding 37 separate C&P programs.156   
Once a claim comes into the office, the VBA must gather pertinent information.  
This may include a C&P medical examination. 157  For many, but not all, C&P programs, 
the veteran must show that the disability occurred as a result of wartime military 
service.158  If so, the VBA must pull the veteran’s service and prior medical records.  The 
records may come from the Veterans Health Administration, Department of Defense, the 
National Personnel Record Center (“NPRC”), VBA Records Management Center, or 
private medical or income records.159  This process is hampered for older veterans’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
non-war related injury was exaggerated during surgery at a VA hospital).  The Supreme Court is granted 
appellate jurisdiction over VA disability cases from the Federal Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1254. 
153 Gary O’Connor, Rendering to Caesar: A Response to Professor O’Reilly, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 343, 353-
55 (2001). 
154 Documents reviewed list both 57 and 58 offices. 
155 VA CLAIMS PROCESSING TASK FORCE,  REP . TO THE SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 22-23 (Oct. 
2001) [hereinafter VA TASK FORCE] (displaying a graph showing that the work force was at a high of 
13,714 in 1993 and decreased slowly to 11,250 in 1998-99 and then slightly increasing to 12,008 in 2001). 
156 Id. at 8-9.  The VBA work is not limited solely to the 37 C&P programs. 
157 The VBA is currently running pilot programs of outsourcing this C&P medical evaluations from the 
VHA to private doctors.  See id. at 20-21. 
158 Active duty injuries that result in a disability are filed as a compensation disability and the program has 
2.3 million beneficiaries.  The 364,000 pension disability recipients are low-income veterans who received 
a serious disability after service.  See VBA, WHAT ARE THE STEPS IN PROCESSING MY CLAIM?, at 
http://www.vba.va.gov/ro/west/phenx/claims.htm (last updated Apr. 4, 2000). 
159 Id. at 47-50 
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 claims, because a 1973 fire at the NPRC in St. Louis destroyed eighty percent of Army 
records from before 1960 and a large portion of other records.160 
After collecting the data, the VBA uses up to five dozen separate factors in 
“rating cases.”161  The average processing time varies on a monthly basis; in November 
2000 the processing time was 158.7 days and in July 2001 it was 184.2 days 162 while the 
average time for FY 1999 was 205 days.163  The VBA’s website states that the time from 
initial filing to a final Regional Office decision is four to ten months depending on the 
complexity of the case and the retrieval of records.164  Cases are “rated” “to reflect a loss 
of earnings capacity.”165  Unlike the “all or nothing” approach of the social security 
program, the ratings are scaled in 10 percent increments from 0 to 100 percent.166  In 
2001, a 10 percent rating would pay $101 per month while a 100 percent rating would 
pay $2,107 per month. 167  No data from the VBA, BVA, VA, or other sources has 
revealed the number or percent of cases ending favorably for claimants at the initial 
Regional Office level.  The statistic is apparently not kept.  This may be partially due to 
the fact that even cases resulting in a payment to the veteran may be appealed if the 
veteran is dissatisfied with the rating. 
                                                 
160 Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Fact Sheet:  Facts About the 1973 St. Louis Fire and Lost Records (Oct. 27, 
1999), available at http://www.va.gov/pressrel/99stlou.htm. 
161 Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Fact Sheet:  VA Disability Compensation Claims Processing, May 2001, at 
http://www.va.org/pressrel/claimpro.htm.  
162 VA TASK FORCE, supra  note 152, at 1-2. 
163 Statement of Rick Surratt, Deputy National Legislative Director, Disabled American Veterans, Before 
the Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, U.S. House of Rep., May 18, 
2000 [hereinafter Surratt DAV Testimony 2000], at http://www.dav.org/voters/testimony_claims_ 
20000518_print.html. 
164 See VBA, WHAT ARE THE STEPS IN PROCESSING MY CLAIM?, supra  note 155. 
165 Fact Sheet, supra  note 157. 
166 Id. 
167 Id.   
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 The initial stage takes a veteran seven months (205 days) on average from filing 
to notification of the decision. 168  The VA’s goal is 74 days.169  The delays are primarily 
due to data retrieval delays and the volume of cases that need to be reworked after 
remand from the BVA or CAVC.  One potential benefit of the lengthening of the initial 
process170 may be greater accuracy at the Regional Office level.  Remands from the BVA 
have dropped from 50 percent in the early 1990s to 29.9 percent.171  
2.  The Board of Veterans Appeals  
Veterans may appeal decisions to the Board of Veterans Appeals.  The BVA is an 
appellate body within the VA, established in 1933, and consists of over sixty members, 
appointed by the President upon the recommendations of the Secretary. 172 Currently all 
members of the BVA are attorneys.173  Since 1992, decisions are made by individual 
members and not by panels.174  As noted above, a large number of cases that come before 
the court are remanded back to the VBA regional offices.  There are two main reasons for 
                                                 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 See Office of Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, AUDIT REP . #5D2-B01-013, (Mar. 15, 1995) 
(discussing the lengthening of the processing time from 106 days in 1988 to 212 days in 1995; and 
mentioning the 50 percent remand rate in 1995).   
171 Surratt, DAV Testimony 2000, supra  note 160 (describing a 50 percent remand rate from the BVA to 
Regional Offices in 1992); VA TASK FORCE, supra  note 152, at 35.  In 1997, the BVA remanded 45.2 
percent of cases.  See id. at 35.  
172 See REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS (FY 2000) 2-3 (noting that BVA was 
created by Exec. Order 6230, and now has 67 authorized positions). 
173 In the past, a mix of attorneys and physicians sat on the BVA.  See FOX, supra note 9, at  18 (2000) 
(citing Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, United States Senate, Veterans Administration Board of Veterans’ 
Appeals 40th Anniversary 1, 3 (1973)) 
174 See Gary O’Connor, Did Decide or Should Have Decided: Issue Exhaustion and the Veterans Benefits 
Appeals Process, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1279, 1284-85 (2000). 
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 the volume of remands:  (1) the open case file system, and (2) insufficient C&P medical 
examinations (33 percent of all remands).175 
The open case file is part of the VA’s pro-claimant stance that Congress intended.  
This allows the veteran to add new information or evidence at anytime prior to a final 
VBA decision.  The entire VBA structure is designed to be non-adversarial and lawyers 
are prohibited in the Regional Office process.  Although lawyers are allowed at the BVA 
level, few oral arguments are held and only 6.3 percent of claimants are represented by 
attorneys.176  The open case file allows the veteran to prepare a more favorable file after 
an initial undesirable rating.  However, when new evidence is added to the file, the BVA 
must typically remand the case for the Regional Office to consider.  Commentators have 
suggested the need for either a closed case system177 or an optional de novo review at the 
Regional Office before the veteran appeals to the BVA.178  A closed case system would 
likely eliminate the non-adversarial atmosphere because of the necessity to prepare the 
record “litigation” before the BVA.  The preferable answer may be true de novo review 
by the BVA—meaning that the BVA would decide a case when new evidence was 
submitted instead of remanding the case to the Regional Office.179 
                                                 
175  See VA TASK FORCE, supra  note 152, at 20.   
176  See REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN, supra  note 169 at 6.  This is an increase from 5.1 percent the previous 
year.  Interestingly, BVA statistics show that, in FY 2000, claimants represented by attorneys did not 
achieve a higher rate of allowances than those represented by VSOs, but they did receive a significantly 
higher rate of remands.  Unrepresented claimants did markedly worse on both counts.  See id at 34. 
177 See AUDIT REPORT , supra note 167, at 6-7 (calling for BVA and CAVC to review evidence as it existed 
when the initial decision was reached).   
178 See VA TASK FORCE supra  note 152, at 15. 
179 Cf. FOX, supra  note 9, at 84 (recommending that the BVA be allowed to “build a proper hearing record 
without the need to remand the case to the regional office.”) 
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 BVA response time in FY 2000 was 220 days, up from 197 in FY 98 but 
markedly improved from a peak of 781 days at the end of FY 94.180 
3.  Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“CAVC”) 
Only the claimant, and not the VA, may appeal a BVA decision to the CAVC.181  
This makes logical sense, as the BVA is part of the VA and makes decisions in the shoes 
of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.   
The CAVC is a seven-member court nominated by the President and confirmed 
by the Senate for fifteen-year terms.182  BVA decisions are reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard.183  Initial decisions are made by a single judge, although a veteran 
can move for panel review by three judges or en banc review after the initial court 
decision. 184  Only panel or en banc decisions have precedential value. 
The addition of the CAVC (originally called Court of Veterans Appeals) marked a 
sea change to the veterans claims process, which until its creation in 1988 did not include 
any judicial review.  Its record, however, has proved to be a mixed one.185  On the one 
hand, judicial oversight was brought to the system for the first time.  On the other, 
                                                 
180 See REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN, supra  note 169 at 5.  “Response time” is defined as “the number of days 
it would take BVA to render decisions on all pending certified appeals at the processing rate of the 
immediately proceeding one-year time frame.”  Id. at 36.  The BVA attributes this improvement to its 
making more use of videoconference hearings, as authorized by Congress in the Board of Veterans’ 
Appeals Administrative Procedures Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-271.  Id. at 6.  
181 38 U.S.C. § 7252. 
182 Congress has recently authorized two additional judges to serve during the period January 1, 2002, 
through August 15, 2005.  See the Veterans Education and Benefits Expansion Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
107-103 § 603 (Dec. 27. 2001). 
183 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4); Hensley v. West , 212 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
184 U.S. Vet. App. R. 35(c).  See O’Connor, supra note 150, at350-51.   
185 Compare James O’Reilly, Burying Caesar, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 223 (2001) (arguing CAVC, in effect, 
duplicates BVA, adds delays without efficiency benefits, and is a failed experiment because both BVA and 
CAVC are “captured” by the veteran community) with O’Connor, supra  note 150, at 350-51 (rebutting 
many of O’Reilly’s criticisms). 
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 however, the addition of the adversarial appeal to the court layered on top of a non-
adversarial system that has not been modified to take account of the new appeals system, 
has led to longer processing times at all levels of the system (see below).  In a sense, it 
raises the recurring question of comparing the values of accuracy versus timeliness.   
Even though the CAVC process is an adversarial one, the court allows oral 
arguments in only 1 percent of the cases.  The file is closed and the CAVC only reviews 
evidence based on the record at the time of the final BVA decision. 186  The CAVC 
reviews law de novo and facts under the clearly erroneous standard.187 
The caseload188 has fluctuated quite widely in the past seven years.  New cases 
have ranged from 1,279 in 1995 to 2,442 in 2000 (the average is 2,090).  Dismissals and  
affirmances have averaged about 54 percent of all terminations.  Partial affirmances 
average about 12-15 percent of all terminations.  Unfortunately the court’s annual reports 
lumps together reversals/vacations/remands, making it impossible to parse the remaining 
third of the terminations—and critics have claimed that too many of these are remands.189 
The time frame for CAVC decisionmaking, from filing to disposition has 
averaged around one year for the last seven years.190 
4.  Limited review by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) 
Either the VA or the claimant may appeal CAVC decisions to the Court of 
Appeals for the CAFC.191 
                                                 
186 See Gary O’Connor, supra note 171, at 1292-93.   
187 38 U.S.C. § 7261. 
188 The statistics are from U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT , ANNUAL REPORTS, ABOUT THE 
COURT , available at http://www.vetapp.gov/AboutCourt/AnnualReport.asp. 
189 See O’Reilly, supra  note 182, at 228-29. 
190  See id. 
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 Under the veterans judicial review statute, the CAFC only has jurisdiction of 
appeals from the CAVC that raise legal, as opposed to factual, issues, i.e., constitutional, 
or statutory issues or a challenge to a regulation that has been applied to the case.  The 
rate of appeals to the CAFC, is, not surprisingly, quite low (only 194 filings in 1999 
(compared to 2,442 in CAVC), and there is a high rate of jurisdictional dismissals as 
well.  The CAFC only reversed nineteen decisions of the CAVC in 1999 (though the 
number of remands is not known).  Its jurisdiction is so limited and it hears such a 
miniscule percent of claims that the court’s role is discussed very little in reports by 
interest groups or the VA Claims Processing Task Force.   
5.  Refiling 
Once a decision is final, the veteran still has two options that are not available to 
SSA benefit claimants:  (1) reopening a claim and/or (2) requesting a revision.  As will be 
discussed below in the statistics section, a majority of C&P filings are not new matters.  
Indeed, a veteran can reopen a claim as many times as s/he wishes if “new and material 
evidence” can be provided.  Nor is there a time limit on reopening a claim.  If the veteran 
submits new evidence, the agency is required to take another look at the former claim.192  
This removes almost all issue- and claim-preclusion effects of a VA decision. 
Revisions (akin to a request for reconsideration) have no time limit, but can only 
be requested once per claim.  A revision can only be granted if a “clear and unmistakable 
error” is found in a prior decision.   
B.  Delays in the Process 
                                                                                                                                                 
191 38 U.S.C. § 7292. 
192 See O’Connor supra note 150, at 352-53. 
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 The average time from the date the claimant files a Notice of Disagreement until 
the case is made final by the VBA—including final decisions by the regional office on 
remand or later decision by the BVA—was 650 days in 2001 according to the VA’s FY 
2001 budget report.  The VA Claims Processing Task Force estimates the average time at 
796 days.  When cases are remanded to the VBA Regional Office, they are then placed 
back in the system to be processed along with initial filings.193   
The delays at the BVA level appear to be the greatest problem with the VA 
appeals structure.  In addition to the fact that there are too many remands, delays after the 
remand are caused by the failure of VBA Regional Offices to give remands priority. 
C.  Representation 
Claimants may be represented by an attorney or a representative from a Veteran 
Service Organization.  Under the VA appeals system, claimants and their attorneys or 
representatives must meet a complex set of requirements.194  Attorneys and 
representatives may only collect a fee for representation if: (1) the Notice of 
Disagreement was filed after Nov. 18, 1988; (2) the BVA has already issued a decision 
regarding the issues; and (3) the attorney-client relationship began at least one year after 
the BVA decision. 195  This, of course, makes it harder to attract lawyers as 
representatives.  Thus, even during the BVA appeals stage, only 5 percent of veterans 
have legal counsel.  However, an additional 84 percent have a Veteran Service 
                                                 
193 See id. at 27-29.  O’Reilly cites a figure of 745 days, supra  note 182, at 226. 
194 See NAT’L ORG. OF VETERANS’ ADVOCATES, WHY A VETERAN SHOULD BE REPRESENTED, available at 
http://www.vetadvocates.com/why_choose.htm. 
195 FOX, supra  note 9, at 40 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) (1994)). 
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 Organization (“VSO”) representative.196  Once the case goes to the CAVC, however, the 
fee payment limitations are removed, (although the fees charged are still reviewable for 
reasonableness and may not exceed 20 percent of the past-due benefits awarded197), and 
the rate of attorney representation increases significantly.  At the CAVC level, 45 percent 
have an attorney when they file their appeal with the CAVC and 71 percent have an 
attorney by the end of the CAVC process.198 
VSO representatives are provided free to veterans by Veteran Service 
Organizations.  However, in the past, many such representatives lacked the ability to 
gather evidence for a case.  Since 1999, over one thousand VSORs have been trained in 
the data retrieval process and can request data to quicken the case filing preparation. 199  
The VA is attempting to increase the involvement of VSO representatives while the 
CAVC is attempting to increase the involvement of attorneys.200 
D.  Statistics 
The following statistics are from FY 1999.  Although more recent data exists for 
several levels of the review process, this is the most recent year for VBA filings.201 
                                                 
196 Until 1988, a long-standing fee limitation of $10 per case was imposed by statute.  The Supreme Court 
upheld this limitation against a due process challenge in Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 
U.S. 305, 323 (1985) (Rehnquist J.) (describing the process as one of “rational paternalism.”)  Veteran 
service organizations (VSOs) supported this attorney fee limitation because they argued that attorneys 
would transform a paternalistic system into an adversarial system.  They also benefited from the system 
because it essentially gave them a monopoly over representation—because veterans could not hire 
attorneys, they joined VSOs for their pro bono representation.  The current attorney’s fee payment rules 
have a similar effect.  
197 38 U.S.C. §§ 5904(c)(2) and (d)(1). 
198 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT , ANNUAL REPORTS, ABOUT THE COURT , available 
at http://www.vetapp.gov/AboutCourt/AnnualReport.asp. 
199 See VA TASK FORCE, supra  note 152, at 59-60.  
200 Compare id.  at 26-27, 59-60; with O’Connor supra  note 150, at 355-57. 
201 It should be noted that no statistics are available for the number or percent of initial filing decisions that 
award payment to the veteran.  The VBA does provide statistics for new C&P benefit recipients.  In 1999, 
133,906 veterans began receiving C&P benefits.  However, of the more than two million filings per year, 
50
 
 
 
 
 Table of 1999 statistics: 
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the VBA does not report the number of filings for a change in benefits versus the number of first time 
filings.  Moreover, an approved claim awarded in 1999 might not have been filed in 1999, so one cannot 
simply divide the number of filings in 1999 by the number of allowances in that year. 
202 See Surratt DAV Testimony 2000, supra  note 160, at 7. 
203 This figure includes the over 27,000 remands from the BVA.  See id. at 7-8. 
204 See VA TASK FORCE, supra  note 152, at 35. 
205 See CAVC, ANNUAL REPORTS (providing data for FY 1999 ending on Sept. 30), at 
http://www.vetapp.uscourts.gov/AboutCourt/AnnualReport.asp. 
206 This figure is for “reversed/vacated & remanded” for FY 1999.  It does not include partial 
reversals/remands.  It compares to 2256 “merits terminations as a whole.”  It does not match the 1,380 
remands reported by the VA Claims Processing Task Force in table S-7.1 at page 35.  Moreover, these 
figure are the remands ordered in 1999 and not the number of remands ordered from the cases filed with the 
CAVC during 1999.  Some of the remand cases date from 1993, as described in Table S-1.4 on page 30 of 
the VA TASK FORCE REPORT , supra  note 152.   
207 See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED.  CIRCUIT ,  APPEALS FILED,  TERMINATED, AND PENDING 
DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1999, at http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep99.pdf.  
Updated figures for appeals from CAVC for the period ending March 31, 2001 are:  Pending April 1, 
2000—158; Filed—151; Terminations by Judges —176; Terminations other—57; percent reversed 22 
percent, pending March 31, 2001—76.  See ADMIN.  OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,  FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
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E.  Lessons Learned from the Veterans Benefits Appeals Process. 
The main criticisms of the VA appeals process concern the slowness of the 
administrative process and the penchant of both the BVA and the CAVC to remand cases 
back to the rating boards.  This leads to lengthy delays in the remanded cases because 
they are not placed at the beginning of the queue.  One explanation for this tendency is 
the inadequacy of the administrative record caused by the informality of the rating board 
process and the lack of representation at that level. 208  Additionally, many C&P programs 
require the claimant to prove that the disability occurred as a result of combat.  The added 
research and paperwork requests from other government agencies causes delay in the VA 
system that would not concern the SSA if the SSA Court were to be established.209   
Critics of the CAVC have also accused it of taking the easy way out and remanding cases 
on one issue when another issue raised would have resolved the case in the claimant’s 
favor. 
Most critics calling for VA disability appeals reform have concentrated on 
reforming the current system.  There is a narrow range of reforms that is typically 
discussed.  The VA Claims Processing Task Force proposed that the BVA not have 
remand authority.  Instead, BVA would retain jurisdiction while the record was reworked 
                                                                                                                                                 
CASELOAD STATISTIC [SIC], Table B-8, (Mar. 31, 2001) available at  http://www.uscourts.gov 
/caseload2001/tables/b08mar01.pdf. 
208 See Gary O’Connor, supra  note 150, at 363 (stating BVA “does not have a neat, organized record”) and 
id at 383 (stating in perhaps the vast majority of remanded cases, “there is not enough evidence in the 
record at the time of a CAVC appeal for the court to grant benefits”). 
209 On average, the VBA waits 53 days for a Service Verification and 83 days for Service Medical Records 
and a total of 123 days for information from the NPRC in St. Louis.  See VA TASK FORCE, supra  note 152, 
at 22, 54.  To compound the problem of remands for insufficient evidence, remanded cases are not given 
priority for record retrieval.  Id. at 48. 
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 and completed.210  Professor Fox also favors a BVA centered reform (and the VA 
Claims Processing Task Force’s proposal).  He recommends that the reconsideration 
before a Hearing Officer at the VBA be eliminated, and instead, the case should go 
directly to the BVA.  To complete this change, Fox asserts that the BVA members should 
be turned into ALJs as in the SSA system.211  Professor Sidney Shapiro and Ronald Smith 
of the Disabled American Veterans, concur with Fox on turning the BVA into ALJs.  
However, they focus their attention on the CAVC.  They argue that the system would be 
streamlined if the CAVC would resolve all possible allegations of error before 
remanding, thus reducing the need for a future appeal.  Additionally, they would like the 
CAVC to enforce deadlines on remanded cases to force the BVA and the Regional 
Offices to reduce inordinate time delays.212  The most vocal critic of the VA disability 
structure is Professor O’Reilly.  He argues that the CAVC and the BVA are duplicative 
and wasteful, instead, he would like to adopt the SSA system of review by generalist 
Article III judges.213 
 These issues are, to some extent, a product of the difference between the 
underlying informal administrative process at the VA and that at SSA.  At the SSA, the 
more formal ALJ process and the more prevalent participation of attorneys (in 70 percent 
of cases) produce a better record.  However, the CAVC does move about 50 percent 
faster than the district courts do in SSA cases—with terminations completed in twelve 
months as compared to up to eighteen months for the district courts. 
                                                 
210 VA TASK FORCE, supra  note 152, at 34-37. 
211 FOX, supra  note 9, at 82-84. 
212 Sidney Shapiro & Ronald Smith, Veterans Judicial Review: Is There a Need for Reform?  (preliminary 
draft presented to the ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice Feb. 1, 2002). 
213 See O’Reilly, supra note 182. 
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  If a Social Security Court were to be established, the lessons from the CAVC 
would be highly relevant.  Our discussions with attorneys and other critics of the VA 
disability process (including representatives of the Disabled American Veterans) reveals 
that, while they believe the system has flaws, it is fixable; and they do not favor moving 
to the SSA-district court review process.214 
 
VIII.  An International Comparison—The Australian Social Security Appeals Tribunal 
Numerous countries around the world use a social security tribunal of some kind 
to decide disability claims.215  Most of these are the equivalent to the SSA ALJ 
adjudication.  Australia’s Social Security Appeals Tribunal, however, is a review tribunal 
that is closer to an Article I SSA Court. 
Australia has a national Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“AAT”) that hears 
appeals from most administrative agencies, with further review of legal questions 
available in the regular federal courts.  But Australia has also created a specialized 
national Social Security Appeals Tribunal (“SSAT”) (along with several others including 
a Veterans Review Board, Migration Review Tribunal and Refugee Review Tribunal).216  
Unlike the other three, the SSAT functions as a first-tier tribunal with second-tier review 
in the AAT.  The SSAT’s caseload is actually larger than that of the AAT.  In 1996-97, 
13,817 applications for review were filed with the SSAT, and 6,849 with the AAT.  In 
                                                 
214 Interview with Ronald L. Smith, Chief Appellate Counsel, Disabled American Veterans and Barton L. 
Stichman, Joint Executive Director, National Veterans Legal Services Program, at ABA Midyear Program, 
“Veterans Judicial Review:  Is There a Need for Reform,” (Feb. 1, 2002). 
215 See e.g., Daniel L. Skoler & Ilene R. Zeitzer, Social Security Appeals Systems:  A Nine-Nation Review, 
INT’L SOC. SEC. REV. Vol. 1, p. 57 (1982). 
216 This description is taken from AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, REVIEW OF THE ADVERSARIAL 
SYSTEM OF LITIGATION, FEDERAL TRIBUNAL PROCEEDINGS, paper 24, chs. 4, 11 (1998) available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/issues/24/ALRCIP24.html. 
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 addition, the SSAT has 277 members (including two full time Senior Members, 38 
executive members, 97 community and welfare members, 97 legal members, and 42 
medical members) as compared to 100 members for the AAT.  The SSAT usually 
operates with three-member panels.  The agency may “take back” and alter a decision, 
without having to wait for the outcome of the SSAT proceedings.  The SSAT may, but 
need not, adjourn its proceedings while the agency reconsiders its decision.  The SSAT 
has the power to affirm, vary or set aside decisions.  Where it sets aside a decision it may 
either substitute a new decision or send the matter back to the agency for reconsideration 
in accordance with directions or recommendations of the tribunal.   
Cases in the SSAT are decided on submissions, written and oral by the applicant, 
written submission by the Department and, if required, the results of inquirie s made by 
the SSAT.  Oral evidence through witnesses is not usually required.  While applications 
may be decided on the papers or by telephone hearings, most applications are decided 
through a hearing attended by the applicant.  In 1996–97, 86 percent of cases were 
decided by a hearing (as opposed to those withdrawn or dismissed without a hearing).  
The SSAT assists applicants to attend hearings by reimbursing reasonable travel 
expenses, conducts hearings out of its city locations and provides interpreters at no cost 
to the applicant.  The SSAT also provides an informal hearing in which the parties are not 
generally represented, although the applicant and other parties (but not the respondent 
agency) may be represented at hearings.  Representation is usually by advocates from 
welfare rights and community legal centers.  
The SSAT has set various performance standards for the time taken from 
registration to finalization of applications.  For example, one indicator used is that 75 
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 percent of appointments for a hearing should be scheduled within 42 days of the SSAT 
receiving the relevant Department’s notice of reasons for a decision. 217  The SSAT 
typically conducts a hearing and makes a decision within an hour.  In 1996-97, 89.6 
percent of decisions were made on the  day of hearing.  The overall processing time at the 
SSAT was less than fifteen weeks in over 60 percent of the cases. 
One discordant note was sounded about the ability of the SSAT to convene in 
rural areas in Australia.  A witness in rural Geelong, Victoria testified: 
 
[I have been asked] to pass on to you . . . [the] many problems with the 
Social Security Appeals Tribunal being unable to reach rural people.  
Apparently it is supposed to come to rural areas, including Geelong, but in 
reality it takes about six months to get a hearing date.  
 
Obviously when people are appealing a decision about social security, that 
potentially imposes a lot of financial hardship on them.  It is a particular 
problem in hearings about medical matters because in those cases there 
needs to be a doctor on the hearing panel and apparently it is almost 
impossible to get a doctor to come to Geelong or other rural areas.  Many 
of those clients have almost no income, so it is very difficult for them to 
go to Melbourne.  Again, I am told that in some cases like that they will 
try to provide phone hearings, but that is ineffective for many people 
because it is just not a way they feel they can communicate.218 
 
IX.  Options and Models for Change 
A. Administrative Changes—With No Changes Above the Appeals Council Level 
One option, of course would be to limit changes in the system to the administrative 
level.  Many such proposals have been detailed earlier in this Report. 
                                                 
217 SSAT Annual Report 1996–97, 24–26 cited in id. 
218 Testimony of Mr. A. Willis, Principal Solicitor, Before the Law Reform Committee, Inquiry into legal 
services in rural Victoria, Geelong, (June 29, 2000), available at http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au 
/lawreform/Legal_Services_Inquiry/Community%20Legal%20Services%20-%20Moorst%20Willis%20& 
%20Stokie.htm. 
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 B. Split Enforcement Model 
Under this model, 219 the SSA would be “split” into a rulemaking/initial 
decisionmaking body on the one hand, and an adjudicatory agency (presumably with two 
tiers), on the other.  This model would require adversary hearings with both claimants 
and SSA represented in the adjudicatory body.  No change would necessarily be required 
in judicial review, although other such models provide for judicial review directly in the 
courts of appeals.  Would the caseload go down due to more satisfactory decisions at 
agency level?  Would the SSA itself appeal many decisions?   
1. Social Security Review Commission (“SSRC”).  The archetypal application of this 
model would involve the creation of an agency staffed with Commissioners and ALJs 
(and possibly an Intermediate Appeal Board a la the Appeals Council, to keep the 
need for Commissioners to a manageable level).  SSA would still make rules and 
administer the intake and initial determinations.  The SSRC would be to SSA as the 
independent Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission is to OSHA. 
2. United States Office of Hearings and Appeals (“USOHA”). A variation, proposed by 
SSA’s Association of ALJs, would create a quasi- independent adjudicative entity 
within SSA, headed by a Chief Judge and Deputy Chief Judge appointed by the 
President.  Initial decisions by ALJs would be appealable to an Appellate Panel, 
composed of ALJs in regional office appointed by Chief Judge for a set term 
(modeled on Bankruptcy Court Appellate Panel).  Existing ALJs would be 
grandfathered in. 
                                                 
219 For discussions of this model see George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some 
Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 315 (1987) and Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Enforcing Aviation Safety Regulations: The Case for a Split-Enforcement Model of Agency 
Adjudication, 4 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 389 (1991). 
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 C. Article I Social Security Court (“SSC”) 
1.  95th Congress H.R. 8276 (1977) (Rep. James A. Burke).  Would create an Article I 
court for appeals from SSA decisions relating to the factual issue of disability. 
2.  97th Congress H.R. 3865, H.R. 5700 (1981) (Rep. J. J. Pickle).  Would create a 
Review Board composed of GS-16 civil servants220 who have had previous 
experience as ALJs to review ALJ decisions, with review by an Article I Social 
Security Court with 20 Presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed (“PA-SC”) judges, 
having ten-year terms to handle appeals in SSA disability cases.  Judicial review 
would be exclusively in Court of Appeals for DC Circuit, but limited to review on 
constitutional questions and questions of law only. 
3.  99th Congress, H.R. 4419 (1986) (Title II). (Rep. William Archer).  The “Social 
Security Procedural Improvements Act of 1986”221 would replace the Appeals 
Council and district court review with a SSC, with 20 PA-SC judges, including a 
Chief Judge selected by the President, having ten-year terms, removable only for 
specified cause after opportunity for a hearing.  The Chief Judge may also appoint 
“commissioners” to assist the judges.  To provide uniformity, the bill provides that 
the decision of one judge becomes that of the court in 30 days, but within this period, 
the Chief Judge may order review by a three-judge panel.  All decisions determined 
to be precedential by the Chief Judge are to be published.  Judges may be removed by 
the President for cause.  Judicial review is exclusively in the Court of Appeals for 
Federal Circuit (“CAFC”). 
                                                 
220 Note that this level of civil servants has now been largely supplanted by the Senior Executive Service. 
221 Discussed in Rains, supra  note 110, at 16-17. 
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 4.  99th Congress, H.R. 4647 (1986) (Rep. Tom Tauke).  The “Social Security 
Reorganization Act of 1986”222 would recreate SSA as an independent agency, with 
the ALJs remaining in the Department of HHS.  A non-adversarial proceeding is held 
before a “hearing officer,” with an appeal to an ALJ available on the record of the 
hearing.  Appeals from ALJ decisions could be taken by either party to a SSC.  The 
SSC portion of the bill is similar to H.R 4419, except that the district courts would 
retain jurisdiction over claims raising constitutional issues or the legality of 
regulations. 
5.  100th Congress H.R. 2117 (1987) (Rep. Archer); H.R. 1666 (1997) (Rep. Tauke) 
Similar to earlier bills introduced by the same Members. 
6.  101st Congress H.R. 2349 (1989) (Title II) (Rep. Archer).  Similar. 
7.  102nd Congress H.R. 2159 (1991) (Title II). (Rep. Archer).  Similar. 
8.  103rd Congress H.R. 3487 (1993) (Title II).  (Rep. Archer). Similar. 
No similar post-1993 legislation has been found.  A staff member of the House Social 
Security Subcommittee reported that no such legislation had been introduced in the past 
few years.223 
9.  Draft DOJ bill.224 This draft proposal, circulated in 1985-86, would create an 
Article I SSC consisting of five regional divisions (Northeastern, Midwestern,  
Midatlantic, Southeastern and Western, with principal offices in each division—NYC, 
Chicago, Washington, Atlanta, SF, and Dallas).  The court would have 37 judges, 
                                                 
222 Id. at 17-19. 
223 Telephone interview with Jeffrey Eckert, Staff Assistant, House Subcommittee on Social Security, 
January 2002. 
224 Attached to memo, dated May 13, 1985, on file with authors.  The proposal is also discussed in Rains, 
supra  note 110, at 1-3 (1987). 
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 including a chief judge, five division chief judges and six associate judges in each 
division.  The judges would serve nine-year terms (staggered to start).  Judicial review 
would be in the CAFC (at the discretion of the CAFC, except that if the Secretary 
certifies that the case has “broad or significant implications in the administration or 
interpretation of the social security laws,” the CAFC must hear the appeal).  The SSC 
would be administered by a Council made up of the Chief Judge, the division chief 
judges and one associate judge from each division.  The Council could sit as an en banc 
review panel.  [Note—there is no evidence that this bill was ever introduced.225] 
10.  Similar SSC model, but with judicial review in geographical circuits.  In 1987, 
Antonin Scalia suggested certiorari review of Social Security Court decisions by courts 
of appeals.226 
D.  Article I Disability Court.   
Proposed by the ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements (August 
1984).  This resolution, which was never submitted to the House of Delegates, called for 
creation of an Article I court to hear appeals from SSA, VA, and other agencies.  
Professors Levy227 and Bruff228 have also suggested such a court that would have 
jurisdiction over SSA and VA appeals.  
 
                                                 
225 It was critiqued in Rains, id., and according to Arner, supra  note 89, at 123, it was shelved after a 
negative editorial by the New York Times, a letter of opposition to the New York Times from House 
Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter Rodino, and a resolution of opposition from the ABA. 
226 Remarks Before the Fellow of the American Bar Foundation and the National Conference of Bar 
Presidents 9-10 (Feb. 15, 1987), cited in Revesz, supra  note 55, at 1137. 
227 Levy, supra  note 10, at 533 (suggesting the veterans court be transformed into a Court of Disability 
Appeals).  
228 Bruff, supra , note 55, at 363. 
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 E.  Article III Social Security Court. 
An Article III version of the court proposed by Representative Archer was 
suggested by the Sloan Foundation Report in 1989.229  While the report did not 
specifically describe the details of the SSC, it would, of course, have life-tenured judges 
instead of judges with 10-year terms.230 
F.  Article III Specialized Court of Appeals. 
1.  Jacobs bill H.R. 3265, 103rd Cong. (1993).  This bill would consolidate review of all 
district court decisions in SSA cases in a new Article III United States Court of Appeals 
for the Social Security Circuit, located in Washington. 231 
2.  Jacobs bill H.R. 1587, 104th Cong. (1995).  Similar.  
 
X.  Summary of Analysis and Recommendations 
A.  Pros and Cons of the Present Review System and Alternatives 
1.  The present system 
a.  The arguments favoring the present system 
i)  It has been in place for a long time and people rely on it. 
ii)  It is the most independent tribunal possible—Article III district judges give the 
review system a legitimizing effect. 
                                                 
229 Arner, supra  note 89, at 117.  The Report points out one tactical reason for the earlier proposals for an 
Article I Social Security Court modeled on the Tax Court—it would remain under the oversight of the 
House Committee then overseeing Social Security—the powerful House Ways and Means.  On other hand, 
a new Article III court would come within the purview of the Judiciary Committee and it  may be that the 
Judiciary Committee will assume jurisdiction of the Social Security Court as it has over the Tax Court. 
230 A possible drawback of making it an Article III court, noted by Arner, would be the ensuing 
complication in combining it with the Article I veterans court—especially since many of the representatives 
appearing before the latter court are not attorneys. 
231 Hearings were held on this bill by the House Subcommittee on Social Security of the House Ways and 
Means Committee on October 21, 1993, but no further action was taken. 
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 iii)  It provides a venue in every judicial district and circuit, which   makes it more 
convenient for claimants. 
iv)  The courts of appeals can review district courts and set national standards. 
b.  The arguments against the present system 
i)  It is non-uniform in its decisionmaking and procedures with no assurance that  
the individual district judges provide decisions that are any more accurate than 
those of ALJs. 
ii)  District court decisions have little precedential value. 
iii)  It is expensive and time consuming: 
Social security disability cases comprise 5.86 percent of the federal district 
court docket in FY 2000. 
District courts take eighteen months on average to process a social 
security disability appeal. 
iv) Magistrate judges do much of the actual work, so Article III independence and 
legitimation is overstated. 
2.  An Article I court structure with review in the courts of appeals on questions of law 
and questions arising under the Constitution 
a.  Arguments in favor of the proposal  
i)  Uniformity of outcomes is enhanced. 
ii)  ALJs can be better utilized (i.e., feed-back loops between the court and 
individual ALJs can be created). 
iii)  Timelier decisionmaking. 
iv)  Reduced burden on the federal court system. 
b.  Arguments against the proposal 
i)  Independence of an “independent agency” plus an Article I court is still less 
then that of an Article III court. 
ii)  Potential loss of geographical convenience 
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 iii)  Would create a larger bureaucracy, unless the Appeals Council is eliminated. 
3.  An Article III specialized Court of Appeals for Social Security Circuit with review 
jurisdiction over district court action in social security cases. 
a.  Arguments in favor of the proposal 
i)  Systematic oversight of district courts. 
ii)  Allows for more expert determinations in order to build a system of precedent 
binding on the agency. 
b.  Arguments against the proposal 
i)  Geographically limited, unlike Circuit Courts 
ii)  Does not really reduce burden on judicial system. 
iii)  Limited docket may make it harder to find high quality judges. 
B.  Our Recommendations 
The case for an Article I disability court presents a fascinating question.  On the 
one hand, the present system has the virtue of familiarity; on the other hand, it can 
certainly be improved.  On balance, we think that a shift to an Article I review structure 
does not just replace one set of problems with another, but would produce real 
improvements in the system of administrative justice.  In drawing this conclusion, we 
view the CAVC experience with VA disability cases as instructive, but not determinative.  
Still, the presence of this alternative system, which though imperfect appears workable, 
makes similar reforms to the social security program seem more workable as well.  In our 
view, SSA has many internal strengths that can make its adoption of a new review 
structure even more beneficial to all concerned than the record of success produced by 
the VA disability appeals process. 
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 Under the current district court review structure, caseloads will increase 
inexorably and magistrate judges can be expected to determine an increasing percentage 
of disability cases.  The main argument against relieving the district courts of this 
decision burden is their Article III independence.  We believe there are ways to counter 
this concern within the context of SSA and Article I courts.232 
With the new status of SSA as an independent agency, there is less of a risk of 
political control of administrative decisions.233  The issue of political control was 
especially sensitive due to the experience during the Reagan administration’s operation of 
the Continuing Disability Review program, which drove many deserving claimants off 
the SSA rolls.  Although CDRs are now being undertaken on a large number, there is no 
evidence of the massive terminations that undermined the credibility of that process 
twenty years ago. 
Moreover, as the ABA has recognized,234 the independence of SSA also extends 
to its administrative deciders, the ALJ corps, over 1000 strong.  This is an objective 
source decisionmaking that is lacking at the VA (where non-legally-trained rating boards 
make initial decisions) and it can be integrated more effectively into an Article I review 
structure.  While more study is needed, the proposal of a two-tier ALJ decision process 
                                                 
232 We put aside any constitutional challenges to this Article I court, for several reasons: first, such a court 
deals with “public rights” matters, and second, legal and constitutional issues can still be heard in Article 
III courts.  See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1986) (delegation of 
even common law counterclaims to an Article I court does not violate Article III); see also  Crowell v. 
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932) (defining public rights). 
233 To further defuse worries about Presidential control of the Social Security Court, members could be 
required to be appointed like commissioners of independent agencies, with one political party limited to a 
bare majority.   
234 In 1986, the ABA gave an award to the Social Security ALJs for upholding the integrity of 
administrative adjudication.  See Charles Bono, Administrative Report, JUDGES' J., Winter 1992, at 23, 41. 
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 might facilitate error correction, since statistically it can be shown that three (or even 
two) judges tend to make more accurate decisions than one alone.235 
There is, of course, a question whether the ALJ level (even with two tiers) should 
become the agency’s final level of review.  The Commissioner may be reluctant to 
completely give up control over the decision process.  Yet, in terms of decision resources, 
it seems that the Appeals Council is no longer a necessary or even cost-justified step.  As 
noted above, in 1987, after the Administrative Conference conducted a major study of the 
Appeals Council,236 it reported that: 
Serious consideration was given to recommending outright abolition of the 
Appeals Council.  This view was premised on the Appeals Council’s 
present inability to do little more than add one more layer to the already-
lengthy review bureaucracy.  (This criticism was not intended as a 
denigration of Appeals Council members, whom the study found to be 
competent, dedicated, and cooperative.)  Before recommending such a 
drastic, and irreversible step, however, the Conference felt that an attempt 
should be made to use the unique perspective and expertise of the Appeals 
Council to help correct the existing problem.  The Conference believes 
that fundamental changes are needed to reduce the Council’s caseload to a 
more manageable volume, so that ind ividual cases can be given more 
attention and the Council can be a significant contributor to agency 
policymaking.  Accordingly, to implement a system-reform function for 
the Appeals Council, the Conference makes [a series of] 
Recommendations for modification of its structure, purpose and 
operations.237 
 
The Conference then formally concluded: “If the reconstituted Appeals Council 
does not result in improved policy development or case-handling performance within a 
                                                 
235 See MASHAW ET AL, supra note 15, at 26-27. 
236 The study was published as Charles H. Koch and David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple:  A 
Study of the Operations of the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council , 17 FLA. ST . L. REV. 199 
(1990). 
237 Administrative Conference of the U.S., A New Role for the Social Security Appeals Council, 
Recommendation 87-7 ¶2, available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305877.html.  See text 
at note 16, supra . 
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 certain number of years (to be determined by Congress and SSA), serious consideration 
should be given to abolishing it.”238   
In the intervening time, it appears that the Appeals Council’s caseload has not 
been reduced and its policy making function has not been enhanced.  Therefore, it may be 
time to consider the reforms suggested herein—moving to a Social Security Court and 
allowing a reconstituted ALJ stage to be the final “bite at the apple” at SSA. 
The proposal for a SSC, drafted by the Department of Justice in 1985-86 (see Part 
IX(A)(9), above), provided for a court of 37 members that had offices in five regions 
around the country.  This number still seems about right.  The Court of Appeals for 
Veterans Claims provides a basis for comparison.  It has seven judges (temporarily raised 
to nine).  In 1999, it received 2,442 filings, and there were 14,881 affirmances of denied 
claims by the BVA in that same year.  The SSA Appeals Council, in FY 2000, made 
about 97,000 decisions that were unfavorable to claimants.  This is about 6.5 times as 
many potentia l appeals to the SSC as compared to the CAVC.  A similar ratio would be 
derived by comparing the 15,829 SSA appeals in the district courts in FY 2000 to the 
2,442 filings in the CAVC in 1999.  Based on these comparisons, the number of judges 
on an SSC should be around 45.239 
These figures reflect the much higher percentage (59 percent) of rulings that are 
favorable to claimants (reversals and remands) at the BVA as compared to 29 percent at 
the Appeals Council.  But if a two-tier ALJ process were made the final arbiter at SSA 
instead of the Appeals Council, changes in the SSC’s potential caseload could ensue as 
                                                 
238 Id., preamble. 
239 The SSC could decide cases in a two-tier (precedential/non-precedential; one judge/three judge) system 
as the CAVC and the bankruptcy courts do. 
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 well.  On the one hand, it might lead to a more modulated level of claimant appeals if 
they were allowed two levels of review before independent ALJs.240  On the other, SSA 
might be given the right to seek review by the SSC as well. 
Regardless of the size of the SSC, the DOJ proposal for geographically distributed 
regional offices makes sense to address the important issue of access to the courthouse. 
We also believe that appeals from the SSC should be to the geographic circuits, 
(like the Tax Court) in order to preserve some diversity on questions of law.  However, 
judicial review to the courts of appeals should be limited to legal issues—the validity or 
interpretations of statutes or regulations and constitutional issues.  Article III court 
appellate jurisdiction of these issues is essential, for constitutional reasons and for 
developing precedent and important legal questions.  On the other hand, fact-based 
review in the court of appeals is of limited value in terms of good faith error 
correction. 241  Class actions and facial constitutional challenges could be preserved in 
district courts, with direct rule challenges going directly to the courts of appeals.   
If, as we recommend, SSA should be entitled to appeal from initial ALJ decisions 
to the SSC, this change would lead to true adversarial hearings before ALJs with the 
government being represented. 
 Finally, making the SSA court an Article I rather than Article III court has two 
further advantages:  it would not be necessary to create more life-tenured judges; and it 
                                                 
240 As Professor Levy acknowledges in connection with his proposal, “[t]he extent to which independent 
administrative review will screen out cases in difficult to predict.  It will depend to some degree on the faith 
which claimants have in the objectivity of administrative decisions.”  Levy, supra  note 10 at 514, n. 294. 
241 See id., at 514-515 (arguing for limited review in the court of appeals).  Professor Levy recommends 
centralizing appellate review in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  We prefer to retain 
jurisdiction in the geographic circuits.  Professor Levy carefully addresses the constitutionality of limiting 
fact-based review to the Article I court at 517-525. 
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 would also make it easier, ultimately, to combine the SSA court with the CAVC should 
it be decided in the future to create an overarching Disability Court. 
 In conclusion, although we do not favor the proposed Article III specialized court 
of appeals, we do favor serious consideration of an Article I Social Security Court. 
C.  Next Steps 
 Whatever happens with the judicial review proposal, we believe several steps can 
and should be taken at the SSA level.  First, the use of attorneys for the government 
requires further consideration (costs, qualifications, etc.).242  Second, consideration 
should be given to the long pending suggestion of closing the file at the ALJ stage.  
Third, amending the “good cause” remand provision of section 205(g) should also be 
considered (so as to reduce the ease of remand at the district court). 
 Finally, we believe much can be done to better utilize and improve the 
performance of ALJs in the disability decision process, separate from the Article I court 
idea.  An ALJ appeals process (using two or three ALJs to review their colleagues’ 
decisions in precedential or other selected cases)243 could aid uniformity and correctness, 
and, if it works well, could take over the error correction and quality review functions 
now performed by the Appeals Council.  The resources currently spent on the Appeals 
Council (reportedly over $64 million in FY 2000)244 could be used to cover the additional 
                                                 
242 This would presumably also lead to coverage by the Equal Access to Justice Act, concerning payment of 
attorney fees, because the cases would then fit the definition of “adversary adjudication” under the Act.  
See Statement by Stanford G. Ross, Chairman, Social Security Advisory Board, at the Tenth National 
Educational Conference Association of Administrative Law Judges (Oct. 3, 2001) available at 
http://www.ssab.gov/rossstatemtaljconf.pdf; see also  SSAB, CHARTING THE FUTURE , supra  note 21, at 19-
20 (calling for the SSA to be represented at ALJ hearings because the claimants are represented). 
243 Selection of ALJs to serve on the reviewing panels could be made by the regional chief ALJs at the 
SSA. 
244 REPORT ON NEW INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCY, supra  note 10, at 4 (citing the SSA Fiscal Year 
2000 Performance and Accountability Report’s figure of $64,671,200). 
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 ALJs needed for the two tier review.  Additionally, some Appeals Council members 
might be considered for positions as ALJs or as members of the Social Security Court.  
Moreover the SSA should use some of these resources to improve its policymaking 
through rulemaking. 
It is beyond the scope of this Report to assess the current effectiveness of SSA’s 
rulemaking, but we believe that many of the Appeals Council’s resources could be 
profitably redeployed to this effort. 
 We are prepared to assist in exploring these and other initiatives and alternatives, 
if called upon by the SSAB. 
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 Appendix A. 
 Allowance rates by district for the 48 district courts with at least 100 SSA appeals 
ordered by their allowance rates.245 
District 
Number              
of cases 
terminated 
Number of 
judgments on    
the merits 
Percentage of 
judgments on    
the merits won   
by claimant 
Number of 
judgments for   
the claimants 
Allowance  
Rate246 
NYND 104 13 0.0 0 0
TXND 170 24 0.0 0 0
KYED 727 132 2.3 3 0.41
KYWD 176 48 2.1 1 0.57
OKND 169 39 2.6 1 0.59
LAWD 148 14 7.1 1 0.68
LAED 118 19 5.3 1 0.85
OHND 437 62 6.5 4 0.92
CAND 188 48 4.2 2 1.06
PAED 283 57 5.3 3 1.06
VAWD 369 88 5.7 5 1.36
MIWD 131 34 5.9 2 1.53
NM 183 21 14.3 3 1.64
PR 167 35 8.6 3 1.80
TXED 158 10 30.0 3 1.90
ALMD 103 7 28.6 2 1.94
NJ 293 20 30.0 6 2.05
TNED 305 84 8.3 7 2.30
WVSD 298 149 4.7 7 2.35
INSD 116 41 7.3 3 2.59
CACD 605 160 10.0 16 2.64
TXSD 164 54 9.3 5 3.05
NCMD 160 83 6.0 5 3.13
SC 363 78 19.2 15 4.13
TXWD 111 31 16.1 5 4.50
NYWD 131 31 19.4 6 4.58
MD 306 79 17.7 14 4.58
                                                 
245 Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Judicial Statistical Inquiry Form: Federal District-Court 
Civil Case, supra  note 47 (providing a dataset that displays the total number of SSA appeals, the number of 
cases terminated on the merits and the plaintiff’s win rate), at 
http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questcv3.htm. 
246 The allowance rate divides the number of judgments for the claimants (ordering payments without 
remand) into the total number of cases terminated.  Of course, the actual allowance rate after the district 
court level will be higher because claimants are ultimately awarded benefits in the majority of remands. 
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WAWD 147 15 46.7 7 4.76
FLSD 143 47 17 8 5.59
CASD 110 43 16.3 7 6.36
CAED 176 41 29.3 12 6.82
ILND 109 40 20 8 7.34
OHSD 311 121 19.8 24 7.72
MIED 275 186 12.4 23 8.36
MOWD 229 70 28.6 20 8.73
FLMD 639 137 41.6 57 8.92
PAWD 280 147 17 25 8.93
ALSD 157 42 38.1 16 10.19
OR 188 52 44.2 23 12.23
NYED 389 87 59.8 52 13.37
ARED 355 184 26.1 48 13.52
GAMD 194 107 29 31 15.98
GAND 269 108 50 54 20.07
ARWD 130 66 48.5 32 24.62
NYSD 305 158 53.8 85 27.87
OKED 110 N/A N/A N/A N/A
OKWD 131 N/A N/A N/A N/A
ALND 413 N/A N/A N/A N/A
TOTAL 13681 3849 21.85 841 6.15 
AVERAGE
247 
150.3 44.24 21.85 9.66 6.15 
                                                 
247 The average number of cases terminated is given for all 91 district courts, and not just the ones 
displayed in the table.  The average for the number of judgments on the merits, the percentage of judgments 
for the claimants, the number of judgments for the plaintiffs and the allowance rate are given for the 87 
districts reporting these statistics.  In addition to the three districts without data in the table, the district 
court for Arizona does not submit statistics. 
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Appendix B. 
DI and SSI Disability 
Determinations and Appeals* 
Fiscal Year 2000 
 
 
Initial Level
1,988,425
Reconsiderations
584,540
ALJ Dispositions
433,584
Appeals Council
122,780 **
Federal Court
Decisions***
12,011
Number Percent
       Total 1,106,344 100.0
       Initial Applications 759,191 68.6
       Reconsiderations 90,805 8.2
       ALJs 253,615 22.9
       Appeals Council ** 1,999 0.2
       Federal Court  *** 734 0.1
Number Percent
       Total 1,106,344 100.0
       Initial Applications 759,191 68.6
       Reconsiderations 90,805 8.2
       ALJs 253,615 22.9
       Appeals Council ** 1,999 0.2
       Federal Court *** 734 0.1
Allow
 38%
Remand
22%
Dismiss
2%
Deny
  74%
Remand
48%
Dismiss
6%
Deny
 39%
Dismiss
12%
Deny
 29%
Deny
 84%
Allow
 16%
Allow
59%
Allow
2%
Allow
6%
Deny
 62%
 
* Data relate to workloads processed (but not necessarily received) in fiscal year 2000, i.e., the cases 
processed at each adjudicative level may include cases received at 1 or more of the lower 
adjudicative levels prior to fiscal year 2000.  Not all denials are appealed to the next level of review. 
 
     ** Includes ALJ decisions not appealed further by the claimant but reviewed by the Appeals Council on 
“own  motion” authority. 
 
   *** Remands to ALJs by the Appeals Council and Courts result in allowances in about 60 percent of the 
cases. 
 
Source: Social Security Advisory Board, Disability Decision Making: Data and Materials, January 2001. 
